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CONGRESS’S TREATY-IMPLEMENTING POWER IN
HISTORICAL PRACTICE

JEAN GALBRAITH*
ABSTRACT

Historical practice strongly influences constitutional interpretation
in foreign relations law, including most questions relating to the
treaty power. Yet it is strikingly absent from the present debate over
whether Congress can pass legislation implementing U.S. treaties
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Drawing on previously
unexplored sources, this Article considers the historical roots of
Congress’s power to implement U.S. treaties between the Founding
Era and the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland in 1920. It shows
that time after time, members of Congress understood the Necessary
and Proper Clause to provide a constitutional basis for a congressional power to implement treaties. Notably, both supporters and
opponents of a strong treaty power accepted Congress’s power to
implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even
though they did so for quite different reasons. This consensus helped
lead to the growing practice of treaty non-self-execution, a practice
that in turn has led Congress to play an increased role in treaty
implementation. The historical practice revealed here strongly
supports the conclusion that Congress has the power to pass
legislation implementing treaties under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, even when no other Article I power underlies this legislation.
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For their comments, I thank
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St. John’s School of Law, and Touro Law Center. I also thank Jessica Saxon for her research
assistance and the editors of the William & Mary Law Review, especially Lorin Kolcun, for
their contributions. The views expressed here, as well as any errors, are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
For a long time, it was settled law that Congress could pass
legislation that would otherwise be beyond its enumerated powers
in order to implement treaties. The Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Holland held this in 1920, when Justice Holmes wrote that if “the
treaty is valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of [the
statute implementing it] as a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the Government.”1 As the Supreme Court
interpreted the reach of Congress’s enumerated powers more
broadly during the New Deal Era, the importance of Missouri v.
Holland’s holding dwindled but remained unquestioned as a
doctrine of constitutional law.
This is no longer the case. Following the federalist resurgence in
other areas of constitutional law, Missouri v. Holland’s holding is
being reexamined. Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz initiated this
reconsideration, arguing in an important article that Missouri v.
Holland should be overruled.2 In his view, the text of the Necessary
and Proper Clause only permits Congress to pass legislation
necessary and proper for the formation of treaties, and not for their
implementation. The Supreme Court considered this issue last term
in Bond v. United States.3 Although the majority of the Court
disposed of the case on statutory grounds, two justices embraced
Professor Rosenkranz’s approach,4 and the issue may well return in
the future.
The question of Congress’s power to implement treaties under the
Necessary and Proper Clause thus joins two other important treaty
power issues as the subject of constitutional controversy. One issue
is the extent to which treaty provisions are self-executing or nonself-executing. Scholars have fiercely debated this issue; it has
shaped practice by the political branches; and it is the subject of a
recent Supreme Court decision.5 The other issue is the extent to
1. 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
2. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867,
1868 (2005).
3. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
4. Id. at 2098-2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Thomas, J.).
5. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). A self-executing treaty automatically becomes
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which treaties can address issues not otherwise within the constitutional reach of the federal government. This issue received some
attention in Bond, although it was not properly before the Court,6
and it has also received substantial consideration in both scholarship and in the practice of the political branches.7 Both issues are
closely entangled with Congress’s power to pass legislation otherwise outside its reach in order to implement treaties. Indeed, both
issues are practical prerequisites for the exercise of this power, for
there would be little need for this power if all treaties were selfexecuting or if they all dealt only with subjects otherwise within the
purview of the federal government.
Yet there is a curious difference in how these constitutional
questions are approached. So far, the debate about Congress’s power
to implement treaties has focused on textual and structural
arguments. Justice Holmes’s holding in Missouri v. Holland was a
textualist one. The challenges raised to this holding by Professor
Rosenkranz and the concurring justices in Bond have similarly
relied mostly on textualism, but with additional reference to
structural principles.8 By contrast, the debates on self-execution and
on the scope of the treaty power include substantial consideration
of other principles of constitutional interpretation, most notably the
historical practice of the political branches and precedents based
upon this practice.
The absence of historical practice from the debate over Congress’s
power to implement treaties is problematic for at least two reasons. First, historical practice is a well-recognized and important
part of judicially enforceable U.S. domestic law upon its ratification, whereas a non-selfexecuting treaty can only become part of judicially enforceable U.S. domestic law through the
further passage of congressional legislation. See id. at 504-05.
6. 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (writing separately to
express his views on this issue with an eye to an “appropriate case,” although acknowledging
that “the parties have not challenged the constitutionality of the particular treaty at issue
here”); cf. id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the treaty at
issue exceeded the scope of the treaty power to the extent that it called for the criminalization
of Ms. Bond’s conduct).
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098-2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See generally
Rosenkranz, supra note 2. Some of the amicus briefs in Bond do address historical practice,
most notably the Brief for Professors David Golove, Martin S. Lederman, and John Mikhail
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158), 2013 WL
4737189.

2014]

CONGRESS’S TREATY-IMPLEMENTING POWER

63

principle of constitutional interpretation. As Justice Frankfurter
famously wrote, “It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of
American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the
Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon
them.”9 A debate over Congress’s power to implement treaties that
does not consider historical practice will be uninformed and
inconsistent with deep-rooted constitutional norms. Second, the
need to consider historical practice with regard to Congress’s power
to implement treaties is especially pressing because this practice
has proved so important to the prerequisite issues of self-execution
and the scope of the treaty power. Given that the need for Congress
to implement treaties in the first place is largely grounded in
historical practice, it would be anomalous to overlook this important
interpretive tool.
This Article considers what historical practice offers to the
question of Congress’s constitutional power to implement treaties
through the Necessary and Proper Clause, which I refer to as “Congress’s treaty-implementing power.” I examine Congress’s treatyimplementing power both when it overlaps with other enumerated
powers of Congress and when it is the sole constitutional basis for
legislation. I focus on the practice of Congress during the time
between the Founding Era and Missouri v. Holland, as this is the
period when one might expect any relevant controversies to have
emerged.
Significantly, during this period there was no serious controversy
about the existence of Congress’s treaty-implementing power.
Instead, this period shows a powerful consensus that the Necessary
and Proper Clause authorized Congress to implement treaties,
although there were differences of opinion about what legislation
was in fact necessary and proper for treaty implementation.
Intriguingly, this consensus was based on conflicting motivations
related to questions of self-execution and of the scope of the treaty
power. Both opponents and supporters of a strong treaty power
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). The Supreme Court affirmed the importance of historical practice in an
important decision earlier this year. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (observing
that in interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause, “we put significant weight upon
historical practice”).
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embraced Congress’s treaty-implementing power because they saw
it as advancing their agendas in relation to the other issues.10
Those who were wary of a strong treaty power embraced Congress’s treaty-implementing power because they saw it as an
argument against treaty self-execution. Starting with the debate in
the House of Representatives over the Jay Treaty in 1796, Congressmen concerned about self-execution cited the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a reason to understand treaty provisions to be non-selfexecuting as a matter of constitutional law, at least when these
provisions dealt with subjects within Congress’s Article I powers.
For them, the Necessary and Proper Clause signaled that Congress
was intended to have a role in treaty implementation and thus
served, in the words of one Representative, as a “shield” against the
power of the President and the Senate to create domestic law
obligations through treaties.11 This view recurred throughout the
nineteenth century and likely contributed to the growing practice of
understanding treaties as non-self-executing.
Those who favored a strong treaty power also embraced Congress’s treaty-implementing power, but they did so because it
offered a justification for legislation that otherwise lay outside
Congress’s power. They cited Congress’s treaty-implementing power
as authorizing legislation in areas from territorial governance to
trademarks, areas in which Congress’s other enumerated powers
were not thought to authorize legislation or there was at least doubt
as to whether they did so. They argued that this legislation could
reach into areas traditionally thought to be matters of state concern.
In addition, although the evidence is more nuanced on this issue,
examination of legislation passed solely under Congress’s treatyimplementing power shows that this legislation was often broader
than what was strictly necessary to implement treaty obligations.
This historical practice supports the constitutionality of Congress’s treaty-implementing power. It is a powerful gloss on the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause in relation to treaties,
10. I use the terms “strong” and “weak” to refer to multiple dimensions of treaty making,
including both the possible scope of treaties and the extent to which they are self-executing.
Although these two dimensions are logically distinct, it was (and is) often the case that those
who favor a broad treaty power also favor self-execution, and those who favor a narrow treaty
power also favor non-self-execution.
11. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 590-91 (1796) (statement of Rep. Findley).
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demonstrating a consistent congressional understanding that this
clause authorizes treaty-implementing legislation. The fact that
both opponents and supporters of a strong treaty power accepted
Congress’s treaty-implementing power is telling in light of their
disagreements about self-execution and the scope of the treaty
power. Indeed, acceptance of this power in historical practice helped
foster reliance on the use of non-self-executing treaties within our
constitutional structure.
The rest of this Article expands on these themes. Part I describes
the current debate over Congress’s treaty-implementing power. It
shows that this debate focuses narrowly on constitutional text and
structure, in contrast to other key constitutional debates on the
treaty power that draw heavily on historical practice. Part II
considers what historical practice from the Founding Era to
Missouri v. Holland suggests as to Congress’s treaty-implementing
power. It shows the impressively strong consensus among both
supporters and opponents of a strong treaty power that Congress
did indeed have the treaty-implementing power. Part III considers
the implications of these findings for constitutional law, both for
Missouri v. Holland in its time and for the debate raised in Bond
today.
I. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER THE TREATY-IMPLEMENTING POWER
The conventional account of Congress’s treaty-implementing
power focuses on Missouri v. Holland and its textual reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in relation to the Treaty Clause. This
Part first describes this account and the recent challenges to it that
have appeared in the scholarship of Professor Rosenkranz and in
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Bond. This Part then considers what
is missing from the debate. I show that this debate is surprisingly
limited in comparison to two other important and related constitutional questions regarding the treaty power—the extent to which
treaties are self-executing and the permissible scope of treaties.
Most strikingly, although historical practice features heavily in the
constitutional analysis applied to the other two questions, it is
almost entirely absent from the current debate over the treatyimplementing power.
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A. Missouri v. Holland ... and Now Bond v. United States
In 1913, Congress took up the protection of migratory birds.
Congressmen who favored protection followed a two-fold political
strategy. First, they passed an act that placed migratory birds
“within the custody and protection” of the federal government and
penalized their hunting out of season.12 But they understood that
this act might fall outside the enumerated powers of Congress, with
its Senate sponsor acknowledging, “frankly ... that I did not myself
find authority for it in any express clause of the Constitution.”13
Accordingly, Senators simultaneously pursued a second strategy of
encouraging the President to negotiate a treaty with neighboring
countries that would provide for the protection of migratory birds.14
This strategy could succeed even if the 1913 Act were held unconstitutional because the treaty-making power was understood to
encompass issues otherwise outside the reach of Congress’s
enumerated powers.15
Shortly thereafter, several federal district courts did find the 1913
legislation to exceed Congress’s enumerated powers, concluding that
bird protection was a matter for the states.16 The United States then
12. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847-48 (1913) (authorizing fines of up to
$100 and prison sentences of up to ninety days for violations of the act), repealed by Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, § 9, 40 Stat. 755 (1918).
13. 49 CONG. REC. 1493 (1913) (statement of Sen. McLean) (arguing that the Act would
be constitutional based upon a broader conception of Congress’s sovereign powers).
14. Senator Elihu Root, a former Secretary of State and a founder of the American Society
of International Law, proposed a resolution to this effect in January 1913, while the 1913 Act
was pending. See id. at 1494. The Senate did not pass this resolution before the congressional
session ended, but did pass such a resolution a few months into the next session. See 50 CONG.
REC. 2339-40 (1913) (approving S. Res. 25, 63d Cong. (1913)).
15. See 49 CONG. REC. 1489 (1913) (statement of Sen. McLean) (“I take it for granted that
should Great Britain and Mexico invite the United States to enter into a treaty agreement for
the protection of migratory birds ... the United States would have the right to accept this
invitation.”); id. at 1494 (1913) (statement of Sen. Root) (“It may be that under the treatymaking power a situation can be created in which the Government of the United States will
have constitutional authority to deal with this subject.”).
16. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 291 (D. Kan. 1915) (considering the argument
that the legislation fell within Congress’s Commerce Clause power to be so “foreclosed ... as
to leave nothing more to be said”); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914);
State v. McCullagh, 153 P. 557 (Kan. 1915). The United States appealed Shauver to the
Supreme Court, but withdrew its appeal after the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was passed.
United States v. Shauver, 248 U.S. 594, 595 (1919) (mem.); see also State v. Sawyer, 94 A. 886
(Me. 1915).
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entered into the Migratory Bird Treaty with Great Britain—which
was sovereign over Canada—providing for the mutual protection of
migratory birds.17 This treaty expressly required that the parties
would “take, or propose to their respective appropriate law-making
bodies, the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the
present Convention.”18 Congress then passed the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918. This Act prohibited actions that violated the
treaty19—and indeed went noticeably beyond what the treaty
required in providing criminal penalties for violations.20 Opponents
complained bitterly that this Act was “a radical interference with
the rights of the State” and that “[t]he real purpose of the treaty was
to make constitutional a law which otherwise would not have been
constitutional.”21 Nonetheless, the Act was promptly upheld as
constitutional by several federal district judges, including one who
had struck down the 1913 Act as outside Congress’s power.22 In
1920, its constitutionality reached the Supreme Court in the case of
Missouri v. Holland.
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes upheld the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act. His decision rested on two key legal conclusions. One
was that the Migratory Bird Treaty was valid even if it addressed
17. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat.
1702.
18. Id. art. VIII.
19. Migratory Bird Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, 755-76 (1918) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2012)) (providing that violations could be penalized by fines of up to $500
and six months in jail).
20. The treaty did not expressly require that criminal penalties attach to violations of its
prohibitions. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, supra note 17. The statute
also went beyond the treaty in terms of elaborating on the process by which implementation
was to occur, including provisions related to warrants and seizures. See 40 Stat. at 756.
21. 56 CONG. REC. 7363 (1918) (statements of Reps. Tillman and Huddleston,
respectively); see also id. at 7370 (statement of Rep. Towner) (“I do not think a treaty could
give the power to Congress to legislate in a case where the effect of the legislation would be
to deprive the States of their constitutional powers.”).
22. See United States v. Rockefeller, 260 F. 346 (D. Mont. 1919); United States v. Selkirk,
258 F. 775 (S.D. Tex. 1919) (having “no hesitancy” in finding the Act constitutional as
implementing an exercise of the treaty power, despite having “no doubt” that Congress could
not have passed the Act simply based on its enumerated powers); United States v. Samples,
258 F. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1919) (reaching a similar conclusion); United States v. Thompson, 258
F. 257 (E.D. Ark. 1919) (reaching a similar conclusion). Judge Trieber, the federal district
judge in Arkansas who had previously been the first judge to strike down the 1913 Act in
United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (1914), was the first judge to uphold the Act in
Thompson, 258 F. at 257.
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a matter “that an act of Congress could [otherwise] not deal with”
and despite claims that it interfered with the rights of the states.23
The other was that Congress could constitutionally pass legislation
implementing the treaty. Notably, Justice Holmes discussed the
first point much more than the second one. On this first point—the
scope of the treaty power—he relied on many different forms of
constitutional reasoning:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters.... The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said
a hundred years ago.24

In finding that the Migratory Bird Treaty was constitutional,
Justice Holmes drew not only on the text of the Constitution, but
also on prior precedents and on functionalist considerations about
the difficulty of protecting migratory birds through a state-by-state
approach.25 In contrast, his reasoning on the second point—Congress’s power to implement the treaty through the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act—was terse and textual. He stated simply, “If the treaty
is valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute
under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.”26
Missouri v. Holland has become the seminal case for both of these
constitutional holdings. But scholars approach these two holdings
in quite different ways, mirroring Justice Holmes’s differential
treatment of the issues. Like Justice Holmes, scholars have devoted
considerable attention to the scope of the treaty power.27 Notably,
23. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (“No doubt the great body of private
relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.”).
24. Id. at 433.
25. See id. at 434-35.
26. Id. at 432. The Court did not reach whether the Migratory Bird Treaty Act might have
fallen within other enumerated powers of Congress. See id. at 430-35.
27. Notable articles in the last fifteen years include Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, The Treaty
Power I]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley, The Treaty Power II]; David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
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their work typically acknowledges that while Missouri v. Holland is
a landmark in the constitutional development of this issue, it does
not stand alone. Rather, Missouri v. Holland rests within a rich
constitutional history regarding the scope of the treaty power. This
history includes: evidence from the Founding Era; positions taken
by leading political figures in the new republic, most prominently
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson; extensive practice by
the President and the Senate in treaty making; starting with Ware
v. Hylton, Supreme Court precedents upholding treaty provisions
protecting the interest of noncitizens as to issues like land ownership that were otherwise thought to be traditionally state
concerns;28 Supreme Court dicta in cases such as Geofroy v. Riggs
embracing a broad conception of the treaty power;29 developments
in the international practice of treaty making since Missouri v.
Holland; and the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence on federalism for the scope of the treaty power.30
By contrast, the issue of Congress’s treaty-implementing power
has received relatively little attention. Prior to Professor Rosenkranz’s article, scholars mostly repeated Justice Holmes’s textualist
reasoning and cited to Missouri v. Holland’s holding on this point.31
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power,
98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); Oona Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope,
and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2013); Duncan Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging
New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1327 (2006); Gary
Lawson & Guy Siedman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 ; Michael D.
Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV. 969 (2008); Peter J.
Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999 (2003);
Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403
(2003); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1317 (1999).
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 284 (1796).
29. 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1889).
30. Between them, the articles by Curtis Bradley and David Golove engage with all of
these themes, and each of the other articles cited in that footnote engages with at least two
of these themes. See supra note 27.
31. See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1874 (noting the absence of consideration of this
issue). Indeed, Professor Rosenkranz claims that “[t]hroughout the vast literature of the
treaty power generally ... one finds only a single truly compelling argument in favor of Justice
Holmes’s crucial sentence” on Congress’s power to implement treaties. Id. at 1875. The
argument Professor Rosenkranz points to is a two-sentence footnote by Louis Henkin in his
treatise on foreign affairs and the Constitution that, if correct, would have shown explicit
support from the Constitution’s drafting for the proposition that Congress can implement
treaty obligations under its necessary and proper power. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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At most, thorough accounts also noted that in Neely v. Henkel, a
unanimous opinion written by Justice Harlan in 1901,32 the
Supreme Court also held that the Necessary and Proper Clause
“includes the power to enact such legislation as is appropriate to
give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to insert
in a treaty with a foreign power.”33 This absence of attention
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 204 n.111 (2d ed. 1996). Professor Rosenkranz makes

a strong case that this footnote erroneously misreads the drafting history. See Rosenkranz,
supra note 2, at 1912-18; see also Martin Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship,
Constitutional Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2095, 2123-34 & n.126 (1999) (reading the drafting history similarly to how Professor
Rosenkranz subsequently reads it, although not discussing Professor Henkin’s footnote).
Accordingly, I view this aspect of the drafting history as silent on Congress’s power to
implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
32. 180 U.S. 109. Neely involved the extradition of a U.S. citizen to Cuba pursuant to
legislation that Justice Harlan interpreted as implementing a provision of a treaty between
the United States and Spain. Id. at 116, 121. At the time, the United States occupied Cuba,
and the treaty by which Spain had surrendered its claim to Cuba required that the United
States would “assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result
from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.” Id. at 116 (citations
omitted).
33. Id. at 121; see also id. at 122 (not reaching whether Congress could have passed the
legislation in question under its enumerated powers in light of its authority to do so under the
Necessary and Proper Clause). For work recognizing Neely on this point, see, for example,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 76 & n.53 (2001); Bradley, The Treaty Power I,
supra note 27, at 400 n.53; Golove, supra note 27, at 1311 & n.801. Several other Supreme
Court cases prior to Missouri v. Holland have language suggesting that Congress may have
a treaty-implementing power. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 147 (1909)
(observing, in holding that a certain criminal statute fell outside Congress’s powers, that
“there is no suggestion in the record or in the briefs of a treaty ... under which this legislation
can be supported”); In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879) (“L[eaving] untouched the
whole question of the treaty-making power over trade-marks, and ... the duty of Congress to
pass any laws necessary to carry treaties into effect.”); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.)
539, 618-19 (1842) (observing that “[Congress] has, on various occasions, exercised powers
which were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given and
duties expressly enjoined thereby,” and shortly afterwards observing that Congress has the
power to implement treaties even though this “power is nowhere in positive terms conferred
upon Congress”).
Professor Rosenkranz argues that dicta in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S.
(10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836), supports his approach. See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1899-1900.
The Court stated that “the government of the United States ... is one of limited powers. It can
exercise authority over no subjects, except those which have been delegated to it. Congress
cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treatymaking power.” Mayor of New Orleans, 35 U.S. at 736. I do not think that this language
supports Professor Rosenkranz’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This language
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reflected the fact that scholars with as widely different views on the
scope of the treaty power as Curtis Bradley and David Golove have
agreed that Missouri v. Holland’s holding as to Congress’s treatyimplementing power is its “least controversial” aspect.34
In his article, Professor Rosenkranz challenges Justice Holmes’s
and Justice Harlan’s conclusion that the Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes Congress to implement treaty obligations. His
primary argument is textual. The Necessary and Proper Clause
gives Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.”35 One such power is the President and the Senate’s “Power
to make Treaties.”36 Parsing this language finely, Professor
Rosenkranz concludes that Congress only has the necessary and
proper power to facilitate the making of treaties—by which he
seems to mean their negotiation, ratification, and possibly their
entry into force—and that this power does not cover the implementation of treaty obligations.37 Accordingly, Professor Rosenkranz
argues that treaty obligations that go beyond Congress’s Article I
powers can only become domestic law if one of three conditions are
met: the treaty obligations are self-executing; the United States
passes a constitutional amendment implementing these obligations;
or individual states pass laws implementing them.38 But by his
account, Congress does not have the power to pass legislation
implementing a non-self-executing treaty unless Congress could
have passed that legislation under its Article I powers in the
absence of the treaty.
In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to reconsider Missouri v. Holland along the lines proposed by

seems to address the scope of the treaty power, not Congress’s power to implement treaties.
As discussed above, the scope of the treaty power has been a much more contested subject,
and the dicta in this case appears to take the narrow view that federal jurisdiction cannot be
increased through the treaty power. Id.
34. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 535 (2011);
Golove, supra note 27, at 1100.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. Id. art. II, § 2.
37. Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1892.
38. Id. at 1938.
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Professor Rosenkranz.39 The facts of Bond are extraordinary. The
petitioner, Carol Bond, discovered that her husband had impregnated her good friend.40 Seeking revenge, she stole toxic chemicals
from her employer, a chemical manufacturer, and ordered others
from Amazon.41 She then smeared these chemicals on the mailbox
and door handles of the home of her former friend, and did so on at
least twenty-four occasions.42 She was charged and convicted of
several federal crimes, including violating a federal statute that
appears to criminalize the possession or use of toxic chemicals
except for certain limited purposes.43 This statute was passed to
implement a provision of a major multilateral treaty known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which required nations to enact
penal legislation criminalizing certain uses of toxic chemicals.44 Its
language tracks that of the treaty closely.45 Ms. Bond argued that
the statute should not be construed to apply to her conduct.46 She
further argued that if the statute did apply to her conduct, it would
have been outside the constitutional powers of Congress to enact,
despite the statute’s role in implementing the Chemical Weapons

39. Bond was previously before the Supreme Court on the issue of whether Ms. Bond had
standing to argue that the statute violated the federalism protections of the Constitution.
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011). The Supreme Court unanimously held
that she did have standing, but expressed no view on the merits of her claim. Id. at 2360,
2367.
40. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1).
44. 143 CONG. REC. 5812 (1997); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Convention),
opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. Between them, Articles I and II of the
Convention bar nations that are party to the treaty from the possession and use of toxic
chemicals except for “peaceful” and certain other purposes; and Article VII(1)(a) requires these
nations to adopt “penal legislation” that “[p]rohibit[s] natural and legal persons anywhere on
[their] territory ... from undertaking any activity prohibited to” a nation that is a party to the
treaty. Id. art. I, art. II § 9(a), art. III.
45. The statute makes it unlawful for persons to possess or use chemical weapons, 18
U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), with “chemical weapons” defined as “toxic chemical[s] and [their]
precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter,” id. §
299F(1)(A), with purposes not prohibited including “peaceful” purposes, id. § 299F(7)(a).
46. See Brief of Petitioner at 42-57, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12158), 2013 WL 1963862, at *42-57.

2014]

CONGRESS’S TREATY-IMPLEMENTING POWER

73

Convention.47 Several amicus briefs supporting her side emphasized
Professor Rosenkranz’s textual argument.48
The Court ultimately ruled for Ms. Bond on statutory grounds.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the six-Justice majority concluded that the Congressional statute implementing the Chemical
Weapons Convention did not criminalize “purely local crimes” like
Ms. Bond’s bizarre attacks on her former friend.49 The Court’s
statutory interpretation relied on a presumption that Congress does
not intend to legislate in areas of traditionally state concern.50
Because the Court decided Bond on statutory grounds, it did not
reach the constitutional question of whether Missouri v. Holland’s
holding should be overturned or narrowly interpreted to limit
Congress’s treaty-implementing power.51 In a concurrence in the
judgment joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia whole-heartedly
embraced Professor Rosenkranz’s argument that the Necessary and
Proper Clause does not authorize Congress to pass legislation
implementing treaties.52 Describing Missouri v. Holland’s holding
on Congress’s treaty-implementing power as “unreasoned and
citation-less” and citing to Professor Rosenkranz, Justice Scalia read
the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause as giving Congress “a
power to help the President make treaties” and “not a power to

47. Id. at 29, 2013 WL 1963862, at *29.
48. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute et al. in Support of Petitioner at 22-28,
Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 2279455, at *22-28 (on which Professor
Rosenkranz was counsel of record); Brief for Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 22-23, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158) 2013 WL 2152519,
at *22-23.
49. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
50. Id. at 2089.
51. See id. at 2086-87. The Court did not discuss whether the implementing legislation
could be sustained as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause; instead,
it merely noted that the lower court had concluded that the United States had waived that
argument. Id. at 2087.
52. Id. at 2098-102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia reached this
constitutional question after concluding that the statute implementing the Chemical Weapons
Convention clearly criminalized Ms. Bond’s conduct. Id. at 2094. In addition to Justice Scalia’s
opinion, Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence in the judgment (joined by Justice Scalia and
for the most part by Justice Alito) suggesting that the scope of the treaty power should be
interpreted narrowly. Id. at 2102-11 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito
wrote a short concurrence in the judgment, concluding that if the Chemical Weapons
Convention required the criminalization of local poisonings, then it exceeded the scope of the
treaty power. Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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implement treaties already made.”53 He also expressed structural
concerns at the prospect of the Necessary and Proper Clause
allowing Congress to pass legislation implementing treaties that it
could not have passed otherwise.54
The Supreme Court thus chose not to revisit Missouri v. Holland’s
holding on the treaty-implementing power, despite the urging of
Justices Scalia and Thomas. But the issue is clearly a live one, and
may return to the Court in due course. This is especially true
because two other developments in constitutional doctrine have
resurrected the importance of Congress’s treaty-implementing
power. The first is the renewed emphasis on the limits of Congress’s
enumerated powers. The broader view of Congress’s Article I powers
taken since the New Deal Era reduced the need for reliance on its
treaty-implementing power, but now that the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts have been cutting back on the scope of these other
powers, the treaty-implementing power may well regain importance.55 The second is the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellin
v. Texas.56 Medellin raised the bar for concluding that treaties are
self-executing as opposed to non-self-executing, and therefore it
likely increased the need for implementing legislation. Between
them, these developments suggest that Congress’s treaty-implementing power will increase in importance as a constitutional basis
for legislation.
B. The Limits of the Current Debate
So far, the debate over Congress’s treaty-implementing power has
focused on a limited set of constitutional principles. For the most
part, the debate has primarily turned on the text of the Constitution,
53. Id. at 2098-99.
54. Id. at 2099-102.
55. This is true despite the turn towards congressional-executive agreements as a
replacement for treaties made through the Article II process, as it is unclear whether
congressional-executive agreements can deal with issues beyond the scope of Congress’s
Article I powers. See Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1238, 1338, 1343 (2008) (arguing
that congressional-executive agreements should generally replace Article II treaties, but
acknowledging an exception where an international agreement addresses matters otherwise
outside the reach of the powers granted to Congress).
56. 552 U.S. 491, 498-99 (2008).
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with some additional consideration paid to other evidence from the
time of the Framing, to structural issues, and to the precedential
value of Neely v. Henkel and Missouri v. Holland. This is evident
from Professor Rosenkranz’s article, which spurred the current
reconsideration of this issue. Professor Rosenkranz’s main focus is
textual (as was the adoption of his approach by Justice Scalia).
Professor Rosenkranz’s article does include a section on “Constitutional History,” but this section engages only with the Constitution’s
drafting history.57 He is mostly silent on the two hundred plus years
of constitutional history that have followed the Constitution’s
ratification. The two articles that have most engaged with Professor
Rosenkranz’s argument—one by Edward Swaine and one by Carlos
Vazquez—have focused mainly on responding to his arguments and
therefore relied on text, structure, and original intent.58
The text of the Constitution and evidence from the time of the
Framing do provide considerable grounds for constitutional analysis
of Congress’s treaty-implementing power. One can form an opinion
from the text alone as to whether the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to implement treaties. In concluding that it
does not, Professor Rosenkranz and Justice Scalia rely on two
interpretive moves. The first is a very precise reading of the text:
Congress can only do what is necessary and proper to facilitate the
making of treaties rather than treaty-related issues generally. The
appropriateness of this precision is questionable. As Edward Swaine
has pointed out, “it is unlikely that the Necessary and Proper
Clause was drafted with the rigor this analysis assumes” and “[t]he
whole enterprise seems to have been debated in vastly simpler
terms.”59 The precision advocated by Professor Rosenkranz and now
57. Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1912-18. More specifically, Professor Rosenkranz
engages here with the absence of material in the drafting history. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
58. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 MO. L.
REV. 1007 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Missouri v. Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L.
REV. 939, 960-63 (2008). The amicus brief in Bond submitted by Professors David Golove,
Marty Lederman, and John Mikhail does focus on historical practice in relation to Congress’s
treaty-implementing power. Brief for Professors David M. Golove, Martin S. Lederman, and
John Mikhail as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158),
2013 WL 4737189, at *10. Their research and mine were pursued independently for the most
part. After we became aware of each others’ work, an initial draft of this Article was cited to
in the brief, see id. at 10, and this Article now similarly cites to the brief.
59. Swaine, supra note 58, at 1013-14.
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embraced by Justice Scalia would lead to all sorts of other outcomes
that seem unlikely to have been intended by the pragmatic Framers, such as the conclusion that the Necessary and Proper Clause
only justifies legislation that facilitates the “establish[ing]” of post
offices and postal roads, as opposed to matters like their maintenance, or that facilitates the “constitut[ing]” of inferior federal
courts, as opposed to matters like their operation.60
The second interpretive move made by Professor Rosenkranz, and
also by Justice Scalia, is to read this precise text narrowly so as to
conclude that the passage of implementing legislation cannot be
necessary and proper for the “making” of treaties. Again, this
reasoning is questionable. First, it fails to account for the possibility
that some treaties may require implementing legislation in order to
be “made”—that is, to be ratified or to enter into force. As I discuss
at more length later, historically, U.S. practice sometimes required
that the implementation of treaties occur prior to their ratification
or entry into force.61 Indeed, today, “[i]n reality, the U.S. government has a policy and practice of not joining a treaty until it has
determined U.S. domestic law comports with whatever international
law obligations the treaty imposes.”62 Second, this reasoning does
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; cf. Vazquez, supra note 58, at 960 (making a similar point
and also noting tensions between Professor Rosenkranz’s approach and other textual
provisions in the Constitution). In practice, the Supreme Court has held that Congress has
broader powers in these matters than the kind of analysis advocated by Professor Rosenkranz
would support. E.g., Jinks v. Richland Cnty., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003) (Scalia, J.) (holding that
the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to pass a statute allowing federal
courts to toll state law claims); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (holding that
Congress has a power “to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts”). Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Bond was silent on the implications of his approach for these other areas of
law.
61. As discussed in Part II.A, some nineteenth-century treaties expressly required that
Congress pass implementing legislation before these treaties could enter into force. In the
present era, the Senate occasionally conditions its advice and consent on the requirement that
implementing legislation be passed prior to the U.S. ratification of the treaty at issue. See,
e.g., S. Res. of Feb. 19, 1986, 99th Cong., 132 CONG. REC. 2349-50 (1986) (enacted) (advising
and consenting to the Genocide Convention but requiring “[t]hat the President will not deposit
the instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation ... has been enacted”).
62. Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 412, 413
(2008). In some instances, this is satisfied by a treaty’s self-executing status, but when
implementing legislation is needed “the Executive almost always waits for Congress to enact
that legislation before joining the treaty.” Id. at 414. The Chemical Weapons Convention is
a rare instance in modern times where the implementing legislation came after the
ratification of the treaty. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083, 2085 (noting that the United States ratified
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not account for the possibility that implementing legislation might
in fact facilitate the making of treaties. Justice Scalia did not
address this issue, and Professor Rosenkranz dismisses it out of
hand. Professor Rosenkranz considers it “speculative” that U.S.
treaty partners would be reluctant to enter into treaties with the
United States if they thought non-self-executing obligations could
only be implemented in the United States via a constitutional
amendment or legislation by each of the fifty states.63 This assertion
is contrary to basic accounts of treaty negotiation, which recognize
that treaty negotiators take the likelihood of compliance into
account and may demand stiffer terms or decline to negotiate with
countries known to have past difficulties complying with treaties.64
Third, as Professor Swaine has explained, the approach taken by
Professor Rosenkranz (and now also Justice Scalia) “underplays
evidence that the Framers were wholly convinced of the need to
systemically develop a compliance capacity precisely in order to
sustain the U.S. treaty power.”65
More generally, it is anomalous to focus the constitutional debate
over Congress’s treaty-implementing power on such a limited set of
interpretive principles. One crucial principle that is thereby
overlooked is the historical practice of the political branches. This
principle has a long pedigree as an important source of constitutional interpretation. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer:
The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the
way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes
that it has operated according to its true nature. Deeply
embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning
to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly
the Convention in 1997 and passed the implementing legislation in 1998).
63. Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1889-90.
64. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579,
596 (2005) (explaining that when a state with past compliance problems “seeks to enter into
agreements in the future, its potential partners will take into account the risk that the
agreement will be violated, and will be less willing to offer concessions of their own in
exchange for promises from that country. If there is enough suspicion, potential partners may
simply refuse to deal with the state”).
65. Swaine, supra note 58, at 1016; see also Vazquez, supra note 58, at 960-61.
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narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it
to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which
life has written upon them.66

The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed the importance of
historical practice to constitutional interpretation in NLRB v. Noel
Canning67—decided just a few weeks after Bond. In that case, which
involved the interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause, the
Court put “significant weight upon historical practice”68 and deemed
it an “important interpretive factor even when the nature or
longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that
practice began after the Founding Era.”69
Reliance on historical practice in constitutional interpretation
advances multiple values. It can inform understandings of original
intent, particularly where early instances of historical practice are
concerned. More significantly, as Curtis Bradley and Trevor
Morrison have recently explained, it advances “the Burkean
preference for long-standing traditions and understandings,” and
furthers consistency, efficiency, predictability, and reliance interests
in ways similar to our system of reliance on judicial precedents.70
Although claims of historical practice should be carefully scrutinized
to ensure that they support the arguments made,71 they play a
valuable role in constitutional interpretation.
The omission of historical practice from the current debate over
Congress’s treaty-implementing power is particularly striking in
light of the central role of historical practice to foreign relations law.
As Professors Bradley and Morrison observe, “Invocations of
66. 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Holmes makes a similar
point in Missouri v. Holland in discussing the scope of the treaty power, where he describes
the Constitution as “a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters.” 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1919).
67. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
68. Id. at 2559.
69. Id. at 2560. Writing separately for four justices, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism
about how strongly historical practice should count in constitutional interpretation. See id.
at 2593-95 (Scalia, J., concurring). He nonetheless engaged in extensive discussion of historical practice in his separate opinion. See id. at 2600-06, 2610-18.
70. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 424-28 (2012).
71. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA.
L. REV. 987, 1042-45 (2013).
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historical practice are particularly common in constitutional
controversies implicating foreign relations.”72 Indeed, in the foreign
relations context, by the time of his second term in office George
Washington was already remarking on the relevance of historical
practice to constitutional interpretation.73 Similarly, cases construing the Necessary and Proper Clause have also drawn on historical
practice. Chief Justice Marshall emphasized early on in his 1819
opinion in McCullough v. Maryland that the question of whether the
federal government could establish a bank “can scarcely be considered as an open question, unprejudiced by the former proceedings
of the nation respecting it.”74
By way of comparison, historical practice also plays an important
role in the two constitutional debates over the treaty power that are
most closely related to the question of Congress’s treaty-implementing power: the extent to which treaties are self-executing and the
permissible scope of the treaty power.75 The current constitutional
understandings of these issues owe a great deal not only to developments in the courts, but also to the past practice of the political
branches. This is particularly true with regard to the question of
treaty self-execution.76 Based on the text of the Constitution, there
72. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 70, at 420. See generally Galbraith, supra note 71
(describing how past practice is the dominant principle of constitutional interpretation in
three important areas of foreign relations law).
73. George Washington, Message to the House of Representatives, Declining to Submit
Diplomatic Instructions and Correspondence (Mar. 30, 1796), available at http://perma.cc/
PYX5-9CSK (defending his constitutional position in the dispute with the House of
Representatives over the Jay Treaty in part on the grounds that “[i]n this construction of the
Constitution every House of Representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and until the present
time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared to my knowledge that this construction was not
the true one”).
74. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“The principle now contested was introduced at
a very early period of our history, has been recognised by many successive legislatures, and
has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of
undoubted obligation.”).
75. While I only focus on these two issues, historical practice plays an important role in
virtually all other treaty-related issues, including the rise of congressional-executive
agreements, the rise of sole executive agreements, and treaty termination. See, e.g., Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 805-08 (1995)
(describing the uses and misuses of historical practice in establishing the constitutionality of
congressional-executive agreements); Curtis Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical
Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 789-96 (2014) (describing how historical practice led to dramatic
changes in the allocation of the constitutional power to terminate treaties).
76. With regard to the scope of the treaty power, historical practice also matters
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is a strong argument that all treaties should be considered selfexecuting,77 but practice adopted a different path. Early on, the
political branches began moving towards non-self-execution on
certain issues, believing it to be constitutionally required or at least
constitutionally permissible, and this practice has continued over
time.78 In addition, the Supreme Court has long accepted that treaties can be non-self-executing,79 and its 2008 decision in Medellin v.
Texas raised the bar for concluding that treaties are self-executing
as opposed to non-self-executing.80 Even Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the staunchest textualists on the Court, have embraced a
significantly in the debates. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text; see also Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (observing the need to consider the issue “in the light of
our whole experience”). There is, however, a stronger textual basis for concluding that the
scope of the treaty power can reach beyond the other enumerated powers of the federal
government than there is for accepting treaty non-self-execution. See Ramsey, supra note 27,
at 969-70.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that treaties are the “supreme law of the land”). The
weight of scholarship accepts that, as a textualist and originalist matter, treaties were
generally meant to be self-executing. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 31, at 2099; Michael
Ramsey, Towards a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1470-73 (2006);
David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 49 (2002); Carlos Manual Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154,
3156-57 (1999). But see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959 (1999) (claiming
that non-self-execution is consistent with the Supremacy Clause and “the Framers’ notions
of democratic self-government and popular sovereignty”).
78. See 1 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
431-33 (1902) (describing some areas over the nineteenth century in which congressional
implementation was used); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights,
and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 407-10 (2000) (describing what they consider
to be nineteenth century precursors to non-self-executing conditions in Senate resolutions of
advice and consent); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Convention: The Ghost
of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346-48 (1995) (describing the practice of the Senate
of attaching declarations of non-self-execution to resolutions advising and consenting to
human rights treaties); see also infra Part II.B.2 (describing part of the history of the rise of
non-self-execution). For purposes of this Article, I do not closely parse the extent to which this
shift happened because non-self-execution was thought to be constitutionally required, as
opposed to being a constitutionally permissible option that treaty-makers could elect to use.
79. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
80. See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). For a few examples of the
developing literature on Medellin and its meaning, see generally David J. Bederman,
Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (2008); Curtis A.
Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131; Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties,
122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV.
91 (2009).
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distinction between non-self-executing treaties and self-executing
treaties despite the fact that “the Constitution does not distinguish
between the two.”81
The constitutional developments in these two related areas are
important for the constitutional question of Congress’s treatyimplementing power, not merely as a matter of comparison, but also
because these developments have had important effects on the
treaty-implementing power. If treaties today were self-executing, as
the original understanding suggested, then there would be little
need for Congress to exercise its treaty-implementing power;82
moreover, if treaties could not reach subjects beyond the other
enumerated powers of the federal government, then there would be
little ground for concern about whether legislation implementing
treaties is beyond Congress’s power.
These connections make it particularly important to examine
what historical practice suggests about Congress’s treaty-implementing power. In the next Part, I look at such historical practice,
considering evidence both from the views of members of Congress
(as expressed in speeches and committee reports) and from legislation passed by Congress to implement treaties.
II. THE TREATY-IMPLEMENTING POWER IN CONGRESS FROM THE
FRAMING TO MISSOURI V. HOLLAND
In the years between the Constitution’s ratification and Missouri
v. Holland, the relationship between the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the treaty power came up frequently in congressional
debates. Interestingly, both supporters and opponents of a strong
treaty power backed the position that the Necessary and Proper
Clause authorized Congress to pass legislation implementing treaty
obligations, but they relied on this determination in two very
different ways. First, starting as early as the 1796 debates over the
81. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
82. See Swaine, supra note 58, at 1017-18 (noting that the “sea-change” in the rise of
treaty non-self-execution has raised the importance of Congress’s treaty-implementing power);
Vazquez, supra note 58, at 962 (describing it as “bizarre to resort to a close reading of the text
of the Necessary and Proper Clause to determine Congress’s power to implement non-selfexecuting treaties,” given that the text of the Constitution favors self-execution).
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Jay Treaty, congressmen who opposed a strong treaty power used
the Necessary and Proper Clause to support their claims that treaty
obligations should be understood to be non-self-executing,83 at least
when they overlapped with Congress’s Article I powers, and
therefore required affirmative legislation from Congress in order to
have effect as domestic law. Second, starting somewhat later,
congressmen who backed a strong treaty power relied on the
Necessary and Proper Clause as the basis for Congress’s power to
pass legislation implementing treaty obligations when the power for
this legislation otherwise lay beyond Congress’s scope, including
instances where this legislation appeared to encroach on matters
traditionally seen as states’ issues.
This Part describes these two very different uses of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. The first use has had only a modest effect on
constitutional doctrine per se, but it helped shape a strong practice
of greater reliance on congressional implementation of treaties than
suggested by the original constitutional structure. The second use
shows that, long before Neely v. Henkel and Missouri v. Holland,
members of Congress were relying on the Necessary and Proper
Clause in implementing treaties through legislation that might
otherwise have been beyond their power. Both of these uses show
strong support in historical practice for the conclusion that Congress
possesses the treaty-implementing power. By contrast, I have not
discovered any members of Congress in this period who clearly
expressed the textual reading of the relationship between the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Treaty Clause made by
Professor Rosenkranz and Justice Scalia, and I have seen little that
even hints at this approach. To the extent that it was considered,
Congress’s power to implement treaties was the subject of strong
consensus, unlike the more controversial issues of self-execution and
the scope of the treaty power. This consensus on Congress’s treatyimplementing power is evident in major treatises on treaty-making
published in the years leading up to Missouri v. Holland.

83. Although the terms “non-self-executing” and “self-executing” did not develop until
later in constitutional history, for convenience I use them in describing the views of
congressmen where these views roughly correspond to our current use of these terms.
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A. Congress’s Necessary and Proper Power as a Justification for
Treaty Non-Self-Execution
The first discussion in Congress over the relationship between the
treaty power and Congress’s Article I powers considered their
potential overlap. If the President and the Senate made treaties
that dealt with matters that fell within Congress’s Article I powers,
did these treaties need congressional implementation in order to
take effect as domestic law? This issue first arose with the Jay
Treaty and continued to recur in congressional debates through the
nineteenth century. Congressmen who believed that congressional
implementation was constitutionally required for treaties that dealt
with matters within Congress’s Article I powers frequently claimed
that the Necessary and Proper Clause supported their position
because it gave Congress the power to implement treaties. Although
they drew this link in the context of treaties dealing with matters
already within Congress’s Article I powers, their view turned on the
textual conclusion that the Necessary and Proper Clause does in
fact authorize Congress to pass legislation implementing treaty
obligations.
1. The Jay Treaty Debate
After the 1796 ratification of the Jay Treaty, a highly controversial commercial treaty with Great Britain, its opponents in the
House of Representatives initiated a great debate about the
relationship between the treaty power and the powers of Congress.84
They argued that despite the provision in the Supremacy Clause
that treaties are “the supreme law of the land,”85 the treaty could
not take effect as domestic law without congressional approval
because Congress was entrusted with the constitutional power to
regulate foreign commerce. In advancing this position, the treaty’s
opponents primarily emphasized Congress’s commercial powers and
84. This debate nominally took place in relation to a resolution requesting negotiating
papers. My coverage of this debate is necessarily selective and excludes many issues. One
such issue is the question of whether Congress was obligated—as opposed to simply
authorized—to implement treaties, an issue that recurs in nineteenth century treaty
implementation debates but that I do not further address in this Article.
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI.

84

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:059

other structural considerations. A few of these opponents additionally pointed to the Necessary and Proper Clause as signaling that
congressional approval was needed for the treaty’s implementation.
The treaty’s proponents responded that congressional action was not
needed to implement the commercial aspects of the treaty because
the treaty had already been made and therefore had become the law
of the land under the Supremacy Clause. But they did acknowledge
that under certain conditions Congress could play a role in relation
to treaties.
To several of the treaty’s opponents, the Necessary and Proper
Clause supported the case in favor of non-self-execution. John Page
of Virginia argued:
I cannot conceive that when Congress is authorized to make all
laws necessary and proper to carry into effect all the powers
granted by the Constitution, the Treaty-making power as well
as others ... how it can possibly be supposed that the President
and the Senate, without their concurrence, can make regulations
of commerce, which may be injurious to the general welfare,
ruinous to the commerce of certain, and even the largest,
States.86

Page understood the Necessary and Proper Clause as giving
Congress the power to implement treaties, presumably through
means such as commercial laws. In this respect, his approach
resembled that of Justices Harlan and Holmes but not that of
Professor Rosenkranz and Justice Scalia.87 In a further, dubious
interpretive move (not adopted by Justices Harlan and Holmes),
Page then inferred that commercial treaties could not take effect on
their own, but instead required congressional implementation.
Several of his colleagues made similar arguments. William
Findley of Pennsylvania observed that although the Necessary and
Proper Clause was sometimes thought to reach too broadly, in this
case it acted as a “shield” because it “would go far to prove the right
of Congress to exercise a formal negative over Treaties of every
description, before they become the law of the land.”88 John Milledge
86. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 560 (1796).
87. See supra Part I.A.
88. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 590-91 (1796). Findley had been a prominent anti-Federalist in
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of Georgia felt that “[t]reaties ought to be bottomed on a law before
they can have any binding influence.”89 He then read the Necessary
and Proper Clause and asked rhetorically: “What is the President
and two-thirds of the Senate? The Treaty-making department.
Therefore, being a department, whatever powers are vested in them
by the Constitution cannot be carried into execution but by a law,
otherwise the [Necessary and Proper] clause in the Constitution
means nothing.”90 John Swanwick of Pennsylvania made similar
remarks.91
Proponents of the Jay Treaty generally resisted arguments that
congressional implementation was needed for its commercial
provisions.92 They did not directly respond to the arguments about
the Necessary and Proper Clause, nor dispute the claim that it
authorized Congress to pass legislation implementing treaties. But,
observing that the Constitution did not give the House of Representatives any role in making treaties, they denied that any Congressional action was needed in order to implement the commercial
provisions of the treaty. In modern parlance, they viewed these
treaty provisions as self-executing. Chauncy Goodrich of Connecticut observed that the word “make” in the Treaty Clause “denotes a
full completion of the act to be done ... a perfect ... act.”93 His
colleague James Hillhouse insisted that a treaty did not need “any
concurrence of th[e] House, or Legislative sanction, to make it the
law of the land.”94
Pennsylvania during the Constitution’s ratification. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S.
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 612
(2004).
89. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 651 (1796).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 449 (“If, then, Congress have the power to pass laws to carry into execution all
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States ... how is it possible
that there can be any authority out of the purview of this general and extensive Legislative
control? Is the Treaty-making power not a power vested by the Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in a department or officer thereof ?”).
92. More proponents accepted that Congress would need to appropriate any money
required for expenditures needed to fulfill treaty obligations. E.g., id. at 656 (statement of
Rep. Coit); see also id. at 661 (statement of Rep. Hillhouse) (“Treaties may sometimes require
Legislative aid to carry them into effect; so may laws, and they were constantly in the habit
of making laws to carry into effect laws heretofore made.”). Congress ultimately appropriated
the funds needed to carry out the obligations in the Jay Treaty. 1 Stat. 459 (1796).
93. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 720 (1796); see also id. at 657 (statement of Rep. Coit).
94. Id. at 660-61.
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Interestingly, proponents of the Jay Treaty did accept that there
might be certain circumstances in which Congress might play a role
in treaty formation. In making the case against self-execution,
opponents of the Jay Treaty cited the Treaty of Utrecht between
various European powers in 1713 as an example of a treaty that
required parliamentary approval to implement,95 but proponents
pointed out that the text of the Treaty of Utrecht had expressly
provided that the treaty would only take effect if it received such
parliamentary approval and was therefore a “conditional” treaty.96
This discussion signaled that perhaps a treaty could be made
contingent on approval by Congress by the treaty’s express terms.
Such a treaty would in essence bind congressional implementation
up into the “making” of the treaty because the treaty itself would
require that such legislation be passed before the treaty became
binding under international law.
The opponents of the Jay Treaty ultimately failed to block its
implementation. Congress appropriated the funds needed to fulfill
certain treaty obligations, and the rest of the treaty was applied as
self-executing in practice, in keeping with the best reading of the
Supremacy Clause.97 But their opposition significantly influenced
95. See id. at 543 (statement of Rep. Holland); id. at 607, 634 (statements of Rep.
Livingston). This treaty was also cited by Thomas Jefferson in his later manual on
parliamentary practice, in which he took the view that the House of Representatives needed
to ratify any treaties that touched upon subjects otherwise entrusted to Congress. See THOMAS
JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 52 (1801).
96. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 617 (statement of Rep. Tracy); see also id. at 752 (statement of
Rep. Harper); id. at 1253 (statement of Rep. Ames). More precisely, these exchanges refer
mainly to a commercial treaty between Great Britain and France that was one component of
the broader Treaty of Utrecht. See id. at 752, 1253.
97. The House of Representatives passed a resolution stating that:
the House of Representatives do not claim any agency in making Treaties; but,
that when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by
the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend, for its execution, as
to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress.
Id. at 771-72. The only statute passed to implement the treaty, however, was the
appropriations statute. 1 Stat. 459 (1796). The commercial provisions of the treaty were
treated as the law of the land without further implementing legislation, as were the
extradition provisions of the treaty and the provision providing that British subjects who
owned land in the United States would not be subject to forfeiture. See Fairfax’s Devisee v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1812) (holding that the Jay Treaty, “being the
supreme law of the land,” protected a British landholder in Virginia from Virginia law aimed
at seizing his land); John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation
of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1295-03 (2009) (describing President John Adams’s
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the practice going forward—so much so that, as the next Section
details, congressional implementation of commercial treaties
became embedded in nineteenth-century practice.
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause and Treaty Non-SelfExecution in the Nineteenth Century
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the political branches
shifted increasingly towards congressional involvement in the
implementation of treaties. Two themes relevant to the Necessary
and Proper Clause’s role in treaty implementation that had emerged
in the Jay Treaty debates continued to mark the self-execution
debate. First, as in the Jay Treaty debate, opponents of selfexecution invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause in arguing that
commercial treaties should require congressional implementation,
rather than be deemed self-executing.98 This argument presumed
that the Necessary and Proper Clause did in fact provide Congress
with a treaty-implementing power—consistent with the later
conclusions of Justices Harlan and Holmes and contrary to the
position taken by Professor Rosenkranz and Justice Scalia.99
Second, as foreshadowed in the discussion of the Treaty of Utrecht
during the Jay Treaty debate, the terms of treaties negotiated by
the United States would sometimes expressly require congressional
approval for these treaties to take effect—thus effectively giving
Congress a role in the “making” of treaties.100 This demonstrates
how the sharp line between treaty making and treaty implementation drawn by Professor Rosenkranz and Justice Scalia is often
blurred in practice.
Here, I describe these trends by focusing on two important
instances in their application: first, the debate surrounding an 1815
commercial treaty with Great Britain; and second, the debate
surrounding an 1875 commercial treaty with Hawaii and its later
extension in 1887.
court-sanctioned extradition of Jonathan Robbins to Great Britain under the Jay Treaty
despite objections by some members of the House that implementing legislation was
required).
98. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
99. See supra Part I.A.
100. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
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a. The 1815 Commercial Treaty with Great Britain
After the conclusion of the War of 1812, the United States entered
into a commercial treaty with Great Britain that further reduced
trade barriers between the two countries. Reprising arguments from
the Jay Treaty, the House of Representatives debated a bill that
they claimed would implement aspects of the treaty, such as its
provisions reducing certain duties on imports.101 Some members
argued that there was no need for such a bill; after ratification a
treaty “is made—it is complete; and no act of the House of Representatives can add anything to its validity.”102 In response, a few
members who felt that congressional implementation was needed
invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause as supporting their claim,
just as had been done in the Jay Treaty debate. For example,
Representative King of Massachusetts argued that the Necessary
and Proper Clause “strengthened” the claim that congressional
implementation was needed because this clause provided “for
carrying into execution the treaty-making power.”103 The position of
King and other members of the House who favored non-selfexecution carried the day in the House and led to the passage of a
bill implementing the commercial provisions of the treaty.
The House bill in turn led to a debate in the Senate over whether
congressional legislation was necessary to implement the treaty.
Some senators agreed with the House majority. Senator Roberts of
Pennsylvania claimed that legislative sanction was needed for
treaties and invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause as supporting
the conclusion that “all power to make laws, for carrying into
execution every power vested in the Government, or any department
thereof, (most obviously the treaty-making power is here included),
is by the Constitution vested in Congress.”104 A majority of the
101. See, e.g., 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 565 (1816) (statement of Rep. Pinkney).
102. Id. at 613 (statement of Rep. Pickering); see also id. at 641 (statement of Rep.
Hopkinson); id. at 565-70 (statement of Rep. Pinkney). Richard Stanford of North Carolina
argued in favor of self-execution except “where the treaty itself should stipulate for some
legislative provision in fulfillment of its views,” but noted that there was no such need for
legislation here. Id. at 609.
103. Id. at 538-39; cf. id. at 550-51 (statement of Rep. Easton) (citing the Necessary and
Proper Clause in arguing that for a treaty dealing with subjects within Congress’s Article I
powers to be made, it must receive congressional confirmation).
104. Id. at 65-66.
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Senate nonetheless resisted the House bill, considering that the
treaty was self-executing, although it would be helpful to have a
declaratory statute specifying which prior laws were repealed in
light of the treaty.105 The matter went to a conference.106 In the end,
the sides agreed that there would be some instances where treaties
were self-executing and others where they required legislation for
execution, although they did not resolve whether this was one of
those instances.107 Instead, they passed a bill which the House
members of the conference considered amounted to implementing
legislation and the Senate members viewed merely as declaratory.108
Although this resolution was inconclusive, it was still a step forward
for supporters of non-self-execution relative to 1796, when the Jay
Treaty’s commercial provisions had been treated as the law of the
land without even any arguable implementing legislation.109
b. The 1875 Commercial Treaty with Hawaii and Its
Extension
An 1875 commercial treaty with Hawaii towards the end of the
nineteenth century exemplifies the growing role of the House in
treaty implementation. This treaty expressly provided that it would
not take effect “until a law to carry it into operation shall have been
passed by the Congress of the United States of America.”110 In other
words, this treaty brought Congress expressly into the treatymaking process by conditioning its entry into force on congressional
implementation—just as the Treaty of Utrecht had been conditioned
on parliamentary approval. When, in 1887, the Senate advised and
consented to a new treaty with Hawaii that extended the terms of
this prior treaty without including a provision requiring congressional implementation, members of the House signaled their severe
displeasure.111 They were led by John Randolph Tucker, a member
105. See 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES 977 (1907).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 977-79.
109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. Convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the
Hawaiian Islands, Commercial Reciprocity, U.S.-Haw., art. V, June 3, 1875, 19 Stat. 625.
111. See 4 CONG. REC. 3031-32 (1876) (statement of Rep. Tucker).
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of a prominent Virginia family whose constitutional interpretations
tended to favor states’ rights over nationalism.112
In March 1887, Tucker produced a House Report that contained
a narrow constitutional understanding of the treaty power. This
report took a restrictive view of the scope of the Treaty Clause
(claiming that the Tenth Amendment limited its reach) and of treaty
self-execution (claiming that treaties that dealt with matters within
Congress’s Article I powers required congressional implementation).113
Yet Tucker had no doubt that the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorized congressional legislation implementing treaties.114
Indeed, like his predecessors in the Jay Treaty debate and in the
1815 commercial treaty mentioned above, he went even further and
concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause strongly supported
the case against self-execution:
This clause is most pertinent to this discussion....
This clause declares that “Congress shall have power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States or in any Department or officer thereof.”
This language makes it clear that while the executory
agreement is in the treaty-making power, the power of execution
is vested in Congress.... The treaty is thus made to depend for its
consummate obligation on the action of Congress, not of constraint, but of independent will; and therefore no such treaty can
bind the country’s faith until the power which makes the
executory stipulations of a treaty obtains concurrence from the
power which alone can carry the agreement into execution.115

112. Tucker was the grandson of St. George Tucker, an early constitutional commentator
with a strong states’ rights slant, and the father of Henry St. George Tucker. See infra note
174 and accompanying text. He had opposed the original Hawaii treaty. See 4 CONG. REC.
3031-32 (1876) (statement of Rep. Tucker) (arguing, among other things, that the Necessary
and Proper Clause entrusted the treaty’s implementation to Congress and that Congress
should decline to implement the treaty).
113. H.R. Rep. No. 49-4177, at 2, 5 (1887).
114. See id. at 7.
115. Id. Similar language can be found in H.R. Rep. No. 48-2680, at 6-7 (also written by
Tucker).
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Despite Tucker’s objections, the extension came into effect
without further implementing legislation.116 His views, however,
would be recognized for decades afterwards as “the best representative of the school which would enforce limitations upon [the treatymaking] power.”117
As these examples reveal, members of Congress who were wary
of the treaty power used the Necessary and Proper Clause to claim
that treaties require congressional implementation in order to
become the law of the land. These debates generally took place
when overlap occurred between treaties and Congress’s Article I
powers, especially its commercial powers. Accordingly, these
members of Congress relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause not
as the basis for the exercise of powers that Congress did not already
possess, but rather as a shield against treaty self-execution when
Congress already had power over the subject matter. But the textual
interpretation made here cannot be readily limited to the context of
concurrent powers. Opponents of self-execution clearly interpreted
the Necessary and Proper Clause to apply to legislation passed to
implement treaties, as opposed to legislation passed simply to
facilitate the negotiation of treaties. As a matter of logic, this
textual interpretation should also apply to the implementation of
treaties when Congress has no basis for legislating other than its
treaty-implementing power. There is no textual basis for interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize treaty implementation only for treaties dealing with subjects otherwise within
Congress’s powers. This is especially true as the Necessary and
Proper Clause itself makes expressly clear that it applies not only
to the “foregoing” Article I powers of Congress, but also to “all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”118
These examples are also significant because they relate to the
broader historical practice of having some treaties be non-selfexecuting, which continues to this day. Efforts like those of the
congressmen discussed above to make non-self-execution doctrinally
116. See UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES 10720 (1919) (discussing the original treaty, its implementing legislation, and the extension at
length).
117. 1 BUTLER, supra note 78, at 413-14.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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required has for the most part proved unsuccessful: non-selfexecution is now deemed to be constitutionally required only for a
few particular subjects at most.119 Yet non-self-execution is not
uncommon in the practice of the political branches. The Senate
today sometimes signals an understanding that particular treaties
are non-self-executing;120 and major trade agreements are now done
in ways that bypass the Treaty Clause process entirely.121 Indeed,
commentators who defend the modern use of resolutions of non-selfexecution in human rights treaties have cited requirements of
congressional approval, like the one written into the 1875 commercial treaty with Hawaii, as constitutional precursors to these
resolutions.122 The story of the rise of non-self-execution in the
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. i (1987) (concluding
that an appropriation of money requires congressional implementation; that it is “commonly
assumed” that a treaty, standing alone, cannot bring the United States into a war; that “it has
been assumed” that penal provisions in a treaty require implementing legislation; and that
“[i]t has also been suggested” that revenue-raising portions of a treaty require implementing
legislation). I think the evidence is uncertain on at least some of these points, but some
commentators understand the constitutional need for congressional implementation on these
issues to be clear. See, e.g., Young, supra note 80, at 121 (noting that “commentators agree”
that congressional legislation is required for appropriations in relation to treaties and that
“[m]ost likewise concede” this with regard to penal provisions). Professors Bill Dodge and
Sarah Cleveland have recently argued that independent of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Congress has the power to pass legislation providing criminal penalties for treaty violations
under its define and punish power. Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and
Punishing Offenses Under Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming).
120. See Henkin, supra note 78, at 346-48 (discussing this practice in the context of human
rights treaties). For few recent examples of treaties in other areas of law, see, for example,
152 CONG. REC. 18,397-98 (2006) (including a provision that most articles of the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption are non-self-executing in advising and consenting to this
treaty); 146 CONG. REC. 18,766-67 (2000) (including a non-self-execution provision in the
resolution advising and consenting to the Convention on Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption); id. (not including a non-self-executing
provision in advising and consenting to the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles but nonetheless stating that “existing federal legislation provides
sufficient legislative authority to implement United States obligations under the Convention
... [and a]ccordingly no new legislation is necessary ... to implement the Convention”). The
trend towards non-self-execution has received a further boost from the Supreme Court’s
willingness to interpret treaty obligations as non-self-executing. See Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 505, 518-20 (2008).
121. See JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE
AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN AS
TREATIES 1 (2012) (noting that NAFTA, the WTO Agreement, and bilateral trade agreements
are approved through congressional-executive agreements).
122. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 78, at 407-08 & n.42.
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practice of the political branches is a longer one than this Article
can fully tell, but as shown above, arguments based on the Necessary and Proper Clause played a role in encouraging this rise.
B. Legislation Otherwise Beyond Congress’s Powers When
Necessary and Proper to Implement Treaty Obligations
The nineteenth century also saw invocations of the Necessary and
Proper Clause as the basis for passing legislation that might
otherwise be beyond Congress’s power when this legislation would
implement treaty obligations.123 As in the self-execution debate,
members of Congress understood the Necessary and Proper Clause
to give Congress the power to implement treaties.124 But unlike in
the self-execution debate, in which congressmen had invoked the
Necessary and Proper Clause to try to rein in the treaty power
through the doctrine of non-self-execution, congressmen who
invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause in this debate were
supporters of an expansive national government. They cited the
Necessary and Proper Clause in arguing for legislation related to
territorial governance and trademark, and the Clause likely formed
the basis for congressional legislation in other areas as well. Their
opponents did not dispute that the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorized the implementation of treaties, although they sometimes
questioned the extent to which proposed congressional legislation
was actually necessary and proper for implementing treaties.
1. Territorial Governance
Territorial expansion and governance proved an early trigger for
constitutional debate over the scope of the treaty power and for
acknowledgement of Congress’s treaty-implementing power. The
principle that the United States could acquire territory by
treaty—even if no other constitutional power authorized the
peaceable acquisition of territory125—was established by the
123. For discussion of the extensive back-and-forth on the scope of the treaty power that
went on during this period in the courts, political branches, and academic commentary, see
Bradley, The Treaty Power I, supra note 27, at 418-22; Golove, supra note 27, at 1149-255.
124. Golove, supra note 27, at 1099.
125. Supporters of territorial expansion argued that the United States had the power to
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Louisiana Purchase, as Thomas Jefferson’s doubts over the constitutionality of such an acquisition gave way to the practical incentives in favor of it. But such acquisitions raised questions about the
governance of new territories and especially where the power lay to
determine the status of slavery.
The Necessary and Proper Clause came up increasingly during
these debates as a source of treaty-implementing power that justified legislation regulating the territories. At the time of the Louisiana Purchase, it was referenced only as an argument against
self-execution,126 but in the debates related to the Oregon Territory,
acquire territory under the treaty making power and, when the United States was at war,
under the war powers of Article I. E.g., 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 49-50 (1803) (statement of Rep.
Taylor); id. at 481-82 (statement of Rep. Mitchell). They also sometimes pointed to
background principles of sovereignty under international law as supporting these arguments
or as an independent source for constitutional authority to acquire territory. E.g., id. at 447
(statement of Rep. Elliot). Occasionally, other constitutional clauses were invoked as well.
E.g., id. at 473-74 (statement of Rep. Rodney) (claiming that Congress’s power to purchase
territory from the states implied a power to purchase territory from elsewhere).
126. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 473-74 (1803) (statement of Rep. Rodney) (asserting, during the
debates over the Louisiana Purchase, that “[i]t is certainly not the right of the President and
Senate to make a cessation [of territory] conclusively binding; when it shall embrace powers
within the pale of those delegated to this House, it will require our sanction. Have we not also
vested in us every power necessary for carrying such a treaty into effect, in the words of the
Constitution which gives Congress the authority to ‘make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution’ [the powers of the federal government]?”).
Professor Rosenkranz reads the remarks of Senator Nicholas of Virginia as supporting his
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1926-27. Senator
Nicholas observed that the treaty with France states that “the inhabitants [of the Louisiana
territory] shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 71
(1803) (statement of Sen. Nicholas) (citations omitted) (quoting Treaty Between the United
States and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200). He stated that
if this provision “is an engagement to incorporate the Territory of Louisiana into the Union
of the United States, and to make it a State, it cannot be considered as an unconstitutional
exercise of the treaty-making power; for it will not be asserted by any rational man that the
territory is incorporated as a State by the treaty itself.” Id. at 70-71. He then went on to
observe that the only arguable congressional source of power to make a new state is the
provision in the Constitution giving Congress the power to admit new states to the Union. Id.
at 71. Senator Nicholas does not mention the Necessary and Proper Clause, and therefore,
there is no direct support here for Professor Rosenkranz’s argument. Professor Rosenkranz
infers such support because, in his view, if Senator Nicholas thought the Necessary and
Proper Clause could implement treaty obligations then he would have mentioned it as a
source of congressional power. In my view, however, Senator Nicholas’s comments seem
premised on a position regarding the scope of the treaty power—namely, that it would be
unconstitutional for a treaty to create a state. Given this, Senator Nicholas could well have
omitted mention of the Necessary and Proper Clause because he did not think it could be used
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the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, several
members of Congress cited it as a source of treaty-implementing
authority for actions that might otherwise lie outside of Congress’s
power.127 Senator Badger of North Carolina, for example, took the
position that:
It seems, therefore, to follow necessarily, as well from the
express grant of power as from the practice of the Government,
that the President and Senate, by treaty; may acquire territory
for the United States. When that acquisition is made, by the
exercise of the power thus granted, the Constitution confers
expressly upon Congress the power to legislate for the government of the territory so acquired. For it confers on Congress the
power “to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution” the “powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof.” To my understanding it is therefore plain, that,
by the treaty-making power, we have express authority to
acquire territory; and, by the provision I have cited, Congress
has express authority to legislate for it when acquired.128
to implement obligations that would, if done through self-executing treaties, have been
“unconstitutional exercise[s] of the treaty-making power.” Id. at 71.
127. I draw here on materials from the appendix to the Congressional Globe, as well as
from the Congressional Globe itself. Prior to 1851, the Congressional Globe did not have
verbatim reporting to the same extent as later, see generally Richard J. McKinney,
Congressional Globe, L. LIB. SOC’Y OF WASHINGTON D.C. (Oct. 2011), http://www.llsdc.org/
congressional-record-overview#G [http://perma.cc/V379-WFZD], and so is especially helpful
to draw from the speeches submitted by the members. It is not clear whether these speeches
in the appendix were delivered in full on the floor, but these speeches presumably reflect the
views of the congressmen who submitted them.
128. CONG. GLOBE APP., 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 1174 (1848) (Oregon Territory debate). To the
dismay of other Southerners, Senator Badger concluded that Congress had the power to
determine whether the territory should be slave or free. See id. For similar remarks on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, see also CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 688 (1854)
(statement of Sen. Badger) (observing during the Kansas-Nebraska Act debates that the
Constitution provides “Congress [with] the power to pass all laws necessary to carry into
execution, to complete, to give full operation and effect to the power of acquiring territory by
treaty”); CONG. GLOBE APP., 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 533 (1854) (statement of Rep. Phillips)
(observing during the Kansas-Nebraska Act debates that “[u]nder [the] provisions of the
Constitution conferring the war and treaty making power, I believe that territory may be
acquired. The right to govern it is an incident provided for in the clause authorizing ‘all laws
necessary and proper’ ”); CONG. GLOBE APP., 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 562-63 (1850) (statement
of Rep. Clark) (observing during the Compromise of 1850 debates that “[t]he power to make
treaties implies the power to buy territory.... Sovereignty and ownership combined, [then]
give the power to exclude or admit inhabitants, and to govern the territory acquired. Besides,
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Congressmen who took the other side of the issue—who argued
that Congress lacked a comprehensive power of legislation over the
territories and therefore that the issue should be left to popular
sovereignty—did not dispute that the Necessary and Proper Clause
could be used for implementing treaties. Rather, they denied that
legislation governing the territories was in fact necessary and
proper to implement the treaties at issue because in their view, the
treaties were already implemented. By way of example, Senator
Cass of Michigan cited the Necessary and Proper Clause and then
argued:
To bring [legislation governing the territories] within this
[Necessary and Proper C]lause, it must be assumed that
acquisition cannot be complete without political legislation; and
that the latter is not merely an auxiliary by which the territory
acquired may be better used or improved for every proper
purpose, after being attained, but that it is “necessary and
proper” to the attainment itself. Certain it is, that the moment
a treaty of cessation is ratified the act of acquisition is complete,
and the territory becomes ipso facto a part of the United States.
Legislation cannot change its tenure, nor make it more nor less
than the treaty has made it. The treaty-making power has
performed its function, and accomplished the purpose for which
it was destined. The disposition of the territory acquired is quite
another question, and must be determined by other provisions
of the Constitution.129

Senator Cass’s remarks highlight once again the connection
between the question of treaty self-execution and the Necessary and
Proper Clause. In essence, he suggests that legislation is never
Congress has power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution any powers
vested in the Government”); cf. Message of President Polk to the House of Representatives
regarding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 486 (1849)
(noting that after the ratification of this treaty, by which Mexico ceded territory to the United
States, he had “communicated to Congress the ratified treaty ... to the end that Congress
might adopt the legislation necessary and proper to carry the treaty into effect”).
129. CONG. GLOBE APP., 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1850) (statement of Rep. Cass); see also
CONG. GLOBE APP., 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 596 (statement of Rep. Taylor) (acknowledging that
the treaty power authorizes the United States to acquire territory and further acknowledging
that the Necessary and Proper Clause can be used to “[carry] into execution the power to
acquire territory,” but arguing that detailed governance by Congress of the territories is not
necessary and proper to the acquisition and holding of the territories).

2014]

CONGRESS’S TREATY-IMPLEMENTING POWER

97

needed to execute a self-executing provision of a treaty—here, the
provision granting territory to the United States—because this
provision has already been executed. His remarks imply, however,
that the Necessary and Proper Clause would be appropriate for use
when treaty ratification does not immediately trigger implementation of the treaty’s terms.
As shown here, during the debates over territorial governance,
those members of Congress who discussed the Necessary and Proper
Clause seemed to accept that it could be used as a basis for legislation implementing treaties that lacked another basis under Article
I, although they debated what the treaties made it necessary and
proper to implement. It is hard to tell, however, how important this
argument about the Necessary and Proper Clause was to the
ultimate passage of legislation on the issue. Supporters of congressional governance of the territories had other strong constitutional
arguments on which to ground their legislation130 and could well
have relied on these arguments rather than on the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
2. Trademark
Although the power to implement treaties under the Necessary
and Proper Clause was only one of several possible bases for
Congress to enact legislation overseeing territorial governance, the
Clause was accepted as the central justification for trademark
legislation that occurred later in the century. Confronted with a
Supreme Court decision that suggested that trademark legislation
lay beyond its Article I powers, Congress responded by relying on its
necessary and proper power to implement treaties in passing
trademark legislation in 1881.
By 1870, trademark protections had developed in the United
States in the common law, in a handful of state statutes, and in
recent treaties with Russia, Belgium, and France that provided
130. This included Congress’s power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
although some argued that this power only extended to preexisting U.S. territories. Compare
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 436-38 (1856) (reading this clause to apply only
to preexisting U.S. territories), with Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-37 (1810)
(finding that this clause gave Congress the power to govern the acquired territories).
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reciprocal protections for citizens of one country doing business in
the other country.131 In 1870 and 1876, Congress passed legislation
that sought, among other things, to provide trademark protection
for U.S. citizens.132 In November 1879, however, the Supreme Court
struck down this legislation as outside the constitutional powers of
Congress.133 It reasoned that trademark was a property right
ordinarily to be protected under state law; that the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution did not extend to trademarks;
and that the Commerce Clauses might not cover trademark and,
even if they did, the legislation swept far more broadly than they
would justify.134 The Court emphasized, however, that it “wish[ed]
to be understood as leaving untouched the whole question of the
treaty-making power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress
to pass any laws necessary to carry treaties into effect.”135
Congress’s reaction to this decision signaled some divide over the
question of its treaty-implementing power. Spurred by a dismayed
business community, within a month of the decision Representative
McCoid of Iowa introduced and sped through his Committee on
Manufactures a proposed constitutional amendment providing that
“Congress, for promotion of trade and manufacture, and to carry
into effect international treaties, shall have power to grant, protect,
and regulate the exclusive right to adopt and use trade-marks.”136
His committee report urged Congress to pass this amendment by

131. See Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The Nascent Treaty Power and
the Turbulent Origins of Federal Trademark Law, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 831-36 (2009).
132. An Act to Punish the Counterfeiting of Trade-mark Goods and the Sale or Dealing in
of Counterfeit Trade-mark Goods, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (1876) (criminalizing the fraudulent
use of trademarks); An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to
Patents and Copyrights, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 (1870) (providing for the recording of
trademarks by U.S. citizens and civil remedies for trademark violations). These Acts also
served to implement U.S. trademark treaties, to the extent such implementation was needed,
because they applied to the trademarks of foreign citizens where the United States had a
reciprocal trademark treaty with these citizens’ country of nationality. For a discussion of the
legislative history of these Acts (including the absence of consideration of the constitutional
issues), see Rosen, supra note 131, at 839-46.
133. See In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-99 (1879).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 99. Treaty implementation questions were arguably before the Court in at least
one of the consolidated cases, see Rosen, supra note 131, at 857-72, but the Court chose not
to address them, see id. at 872.
136. H.R. REP. NO. 46-3, at 1 (2d Sess. 1879).
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the Christmas holiday—then less than two weeks away.137 While
this proposed amendment swept more broadly than treaty implementation, its inclusion of the phrase “carry into effect international
treaties” could be read to suggest that McCoid doubted Congress
had a treaty-implementing power. This reading offers mild support
for Professor Rosenkranz’s approach, but other remarks by McCoid
suggest that his concern was not that Congress lacked a treatyimplementing power, but rather that he did not think the terms of
the relevant treaties authorized Congress to provide trademark
protections. Specifically, McCoid asserted that the treaties provided
only that the trademarks of foreigners be protected to the same
extent as the trademarks of citizens, and concluded that because the
treaties did not expressly authorize affirmative protections for the
trademarks of U.S. citizens, “the power to enforce these treaties
would not give us the power to protect these trade-marks.”138
But if McCoid’s proposed amendment offers a touch of support for
Professor Rosenkranz’s views, other reactions demonstrate the
constitutional case for the treaty-implementing power, as well as
the impracticality of relying on constitutional amendments for
treaty implementation and the risks in doing so to U.S. policy
interests. McCoid was quickly confronted with the reality that it
was “perfectly sure” that there would be no swift supermajority in
the House favoring a constitutional amendment,139 let alone much
hope for the other hurdles that a constitutional amendment must
surmount. Meanwhile, members of the U.S. and international
business community were dismayed by the absence of trademark
protections.140 Indeed, the response of foreign nations suggests that
it is far from “speculative” that the presence or absence of Congress’s treaty-implementing power will affect the ease with which
the United States can enter into treaties.141 As Zvi Rosen observes,
“Not a single nation entered into a trademark treaty with the
U.S. in 1879 or 1880.”142 It was not until the passage of the congressional legislation discussed below that nations were sufficiently
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 3.
10 CONG. REC. 147 (1880).
Id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Cox).
See Rosen, supra note 131, at 874, 879-80.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1889-90.
Rosen, supra note 131, at 889.
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“reassure[d]” to conclude new trademark treaties with the United
States.143
Not long after McCoid’s proposed amendment, congressmen began
to consider whether the treaty-implementing power might justify at
least limited congressional legislation on trademark.144 The House
referred McCoid’s proposed amendment—as well as other proposals
for trademark legislation—to the Judiciary Committee, where
Representative Hammond of Georgia took the lead in reviewing the
issue.145 Ultimately, the Committee on the Judiciary recommended
against a constitutional amendment, but proposed legislation based
on Congress’s treaty-implementing power.146 The Committee
concluded that Congress did not have the power to regulate
trademarks under any of the Commerce Clauses because, in its
view, trademarks were “not necessary to commerce.”147 Nonetheless,
it concluded that Congress could pass a bill providing protections for
trademarks used in foreign commerce and commerce with the
Indian tribes—though not interstate commerce—based on the
treaty-making power.148 The Committee Report cited the Treaty
Clause and explained briefly that:
[If treaties are] complete in themselves, they are self-operative.
If they need legislative aid, Congress can give it under its power
“to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”149

143. Id. at 888-89 (noting that four European nations signed treaties with the United
States within two years of the passage of the 1881 Act).
144. An editorial in the New York Tribune also considered this constitutional question,
asserting without citation that “it [would] be a new discovery in constitutional law that the
President and Senate can, by making a treaty, enlarge the power of Congress to legislate
affecting [domestic] affairs.” Editorial, Trade Trademark Treaties, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1879,
at 4. It went on to suggest that “any legislation which rests on treaties must run within very
narrow limits.” Id.
145. H.R. REP. 46-561, at 1 (1880).
146. Id. at 5-6.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. at 6. The inclusion of commerce with Indian tribes is puzzling because after 1871,
the United States no longer used Article II treaties in dealing with the Indian tribes. See
Indian Appropriation Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)).
149. H.R. REP. NO. 46-561, at 6.
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Hammond repeated these positions on the House floor, citing the
Necessary and Proper Clause and stating that “Congress, though
powerless [to legislate as to foreign trademarks] under the commerce clause, may so legislate in the aid of the treaty-making
power.”150
Among other issues, Hammond considered the extent to which
trademark legislation was in fact necessary and proper for the
trademark treaties. For the most part, the existing trademark
treaties simply provided for reciprocity: the United States committed to protecting the trademarks of citizens of treaty partners to the
same extent as the trademarks of its own citizens were protected.151
But the trademark treaty with Belgium had prohibited the counterfeiting in each country of the other country’s trademarks and called
for damages as a civil remedy.152 The bill proposed by Hammond
provided for the registration of trademarks used in foreign or Indian
commerce for those domiciled in countries or tribes “which by treaty,
convention or law” afforded reciprocal protections to U.S. citizens.153
It also spelled out some particulars about the registration process
and provided a remedy against counterfeited trademarks.154 So far,
the provisions of the bill closely tracked what the Belgium treaty
required, and Hammond opposed the inclusion of provisions
criminalizing counterfeiting, which he observed were demanded
by “[n]o treaty obligation.”155 Yet in other ways, the bill went
noticeably beyond what was narrowly necessary to implement treaty
obligations. For one thing, its prohibition on counterfeiting applied
not only to the Belgium treaty, but also to all other trademark

150. 10 CONG. REC. 2703 (1880). Hammond further noted the connection between non-selfexecution and congressional implementation, citing Foster v. Neilson for the proposition that
some treaties are non-self-executing and observing that “all that is desirable [in terms of
domestic implementation] may be done by the treaty-making power alone, or by it and Congress together.” Id.
151. See id. at 2703-04. Hammond noted that these provisions were already largely being
implemented as self-executing. See id. at 2704.
152. See id. at 2703. An earlier version of a trademark treaty with Russia had similar
provisions, although later amendments may have bound this up in the scope of protections
afforded to each country’s own citizens. See id.
153. Id. at 2701.
154. See id. This section also provided for registration for “owners ... domiciled in the
United States.” See id.
155. See id. at 2704.
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treaties.156 For another, it prohibited fraudulent obtainment of
trademarks, although no treaty required this provision.157 Finally,
it allowed U.S. citizens to register their trademarks for purposes of
obtaining foreign trademark registration—a provision not required
by treaty obligations, although helpful in enabling U.S. citizens to
gain the benefits of existing treaties.158
Hammond’s approach prevailed. With little further discussion,
the House passed his proposed bill, and the Senate followed suit in
the following session, with the bill becoming law in 1881.159
Although the statute itself is silent on the constitutional source of
its authority, this legislative history makes clear that the sole
justification offered for it by its chief proponent was Congress’s
treaty-implementing power.
3. Other
Territorial governance and trademark are the areas in which,
based on my review, nineteenth-century members of Congress most
explicitly discussed the issue of Congress’s power to implement
treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause in the absence of
any other constitutional basis for the legislation at issue. But other
legislation may be attributed to Congress’s treaty-implementing
power as well—legislation that Congress passed without much
consideration of its constitutionality, but which seems likely based
solely on Congress’s treaty-implementing power.160
156. See id. at 2701 (showing that the registration provisions of the bill provided for
trademark registration by domiciles of any country that allowed for U.S. citizens to register
trademarks; and the counterfeiting protection provisions were available to anyone with a
registered trademark).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Rosen, supra note 131, at 887-88; see also An Act to Authorize the Registration of
Trade-Marks and to Protect the Same, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881), repealed by 60 Stat. 444
(1946).
160. There are also instances of unpassed legislative efforts that were apparently based
solely on Congress’s treaty-implementing power, although these efforts were not always
explained in these terms. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, for example, Congress considered—but never passed—legislation giving federal courts the power to
try crimes against aliens protected by treaty rights. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 56-392 (1900).
Proponents of this legislation did not always expressly invoke the Necessary and Proper
Clause. E.g., id. at 4 (simply stating that if “a treaty stipulation be a part of the supreme law
of the land, it is not only the right, but it is the duty of Congress to provide for its enforcement
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Extradition legislation is one example. Although extradition
provisions in treaties were taken early on to be self-executing,161 in
1848, Congress passed a statute that authorized the fulfillment of
extradition treaty obligations by the judicial and executive branches.162 The Congressional Globe reveals no discussion of the constitutional basis of this statute although, interestingly, one of the Act’s
provisions was that it “shall continue in force during the existence
of any treaty of extradition with any foreign government and no
longer.”163 An opinion by the U.S. Attorney General in 1853 on the
related issue of deserting seamen, however, emphasized that the
extradition power “is not founded upon express provisions of the
Constitution,” but is instead “derived from the treaty-making
power,” giving rise to treaty provisions “to carry which into effect is
the object of the appropriate acts of Congress.”164 He did not specify
the power by which Congress derived the authority to carry into
and for the enjoyment of it by those who are entitled thereto”). A committee of the American
Bar Association suggested in 1892 that principles of enumerated powers and federalism would
make any treaty that provided for such criminal jurisdiction “null and void,” and that the
proposed legislation was similarly constitutionally problematic. 15 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 395, 419 (1892). But see JOHN MARBRY MATHEWS, THE CONDUCT
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 188 n.3 (1922) (noting that this report was never adopted
by the ABA and that at least one committee member later changed his mind). Responding to
this report, President Taft devoted considerable attention in one of his books to explaining
why the scope of the treaty power reached the protection of aliens despite principles of
federalism. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 40-80 (1914). He further
explained that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized Congress to pass legislation
making offenses against aliens protected by treaties into federal crimes. Id. at 80-81. “It needs
no straining of logic, but only the use of the reasoning pursued by the Supreme Court in
hundreds of similar cases [sic], to deduce the power of Congress under that [Necessary and
Proper] clause to enact legislation to carry out and execute such an agreement by the United
States to protect aliens from lawless violence.” Id. For additional discussion, see Brief for
Amici Curiae Professors of International Law and Legal History in Support of Respondent,
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 4507956, at *12-14.
161. See supra note 97.
162. An Act for Giving Effect to Certain Treaty Stipulations Between This and Foreign
Governments, for the Apprehension and Delivering Up of Certain Offenders, ch. 167, 9 Stat.
302 (1848) (amended at 62 Stat. 824) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012)). This
legislation followed a decision by one court that an extradition treaty with France was nonself-executing. See SAMUEL THAYER SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 59-61 (3d ed. 1879).
163. 9 Stat. at 303; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012) (codifying the current version of this
provision).
164. Caleb Cushing, Surrender of Deserting Seamen (October 14, 1853), in 6 OP. A.G. 148,
155 (1853-54). The statute at issue in this case was an 1829 statute providing for the
enforcement of treaty stipulations regarding the restoration of deserting seamen. Id. at 148.
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effect extradition treaties, but given his conclusion that the
extradition power derives only from the treaty power, it is hard to
think of a source other than the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Samuel Thayer Spear’s 1879 treatise on extradition made the connection more explicitly, asserting that Congress’s “power to pass
such a law” rested on Congress’s power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to implement treaties.165 Additionally, as noted earlier, Neely v. Henkel considered congressional legislation authorizing
extradition and upheld it in that instance solely on the basis of
Congress’s treaty-implementing power.166
Several other types of legislation in the nineteenth century were
likely based on Congress’s treaty-implementing power. Examples
include legislation relating to consular courts abroad167 and legislation addressing claims settlement.168 These instances do not reveal
clear congressional intent to exercise the treaty-implementing
power, but they do provide further support for its existence in
practice.

165. SPEAR, supra note 162, at 7-8; see also id. at 37 (making a similar point).
166. 180 U.S. 109, 116, 121 (1901).
167. Congress’s treaty-implementing power offered a justification for legislation regulating
extraterritorial conduct, as Congress’s ordinary powers were not understood to reach
extraterritorially, although I have not come across express discussion of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the debates. Compare 15 CONG. REC. 1646 (1884) (statement of Sen. Jones
of Florida) (arguing that even though the treaty-making power reaches consular courts,
Congress has no constitutional basis for passing implementing legislation, but referring only
to the “seventeen distinct grants of authority in the enumerated powers” and making no
references to the eighteenth Necessary and Proper Clause), with id. at 1647 (statement of
Sen. Garland) (“[W]hen the [consular] treaty is made Congress can pass a law to enforce it.
That is all there is of it. It is a clear case. It is within the jurisdiction of Congress under the
treaty-making power.”). See also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1891). This legislation failed
to provide the protections of the Bill of Rights to U.S. civilians tried in consular courts, see
generally id., but the Supreme Court has since made clear that some Bill of Rights protections
reach extraterritorially. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 15-18 (1956) (plurality opinion).
168. See 2 BUTLER, supra note 78, at 286-313. For other possible examples, see SAMUEL
BENJAMIN CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 239-40 (2d ed. 1916)
(describing various types of implementing legislation, though without discussing whether
other constitutional bases existed for this legislation); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 185-86 (1922) (listing examples of legislation aimed at
imposing criminal penalties for treaty obligations, as well as discussing legislation aimed at
treaty obligations related to extradition and to the return of deserting seamen).
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C. Treatises by the Time of Missouri v. Holland
The early twentieth century saw a boom in scholarly interest in
the treaty power. Between the Supreme Court decisions of Neely v.
Henkel in 1901 and Missouri v. Holland in 1920, several significant
treatises took up constitutional questions relating to the treaty
power, including Congress’s treaty-implementing power. These
treatises took sharply different views on many issues, ranging from
Charles Henry Butler’s understanding of a strong treaty power to
Henry St. George Tucker’s insistence on a weak one. But as far as
I can tell, all authors to consider the issue agreed that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to implement
treaties.
Butler wrote his two-volume treatise, The Treaty-Making Power
of the United States, in the time between serving as a legal expert
on a bilateral commission in 1898 and becoming the Supreme Court
Reporter in 1902.169 He deemed himself descended from a supporter
of the treaty power,170 and while his treatise considered evidence
from the Founding Era, historical practice, and scholarly treatises
on all sides of the constitutional issues, he generally came down in
favor of a strong treaty power. He considered the treaty power to
“extend[ ] to every subject which can be the basis of negotiation and
contract between any of the sovereign powers of the world” and to
preempt state law “even if such provisions relate to matters wholly
within State jurisdiction.”171 Butler further considered that the
Necessary and Proper Clause gave rise to a treaty-implementing
power for Congress, both on the basis of its text and in light of
historical practice like the extradition legislation.172
Tucker’s Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power Under the
Constitution of the United States was written largely in response to
Butler’s treatise. The son of John Randolph Tucker, he shared his
169. 1 BUTLER, supra note 78, at i.
170. Butler dedicated his treatise to his grandfather, who “[o]n more than one occasion,
while he was Attorney General [of the United States in the 1830s] sustained The TreatyMaking Power of the United States before the Supreme Court.” Id. at front matter.
171. Id. at 5-6.
172. See id.; 2 BUTLER, supra note 78, at 139-44, 315 & n.5, 316-24. Butler also cited
evidence from the drafting history in support of this reading, id. at 140, but this evidence is
the same point made by Professor Henkin that Professor Rosenkranz has shown not to be
applicable. See supra note 31.
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father’s narrow view of the treaty power, partly motivated by fear
that a broad treaty power could be used to force racial integration
upon segregationist states.173 Tucker believed that the treaty power
had limited scope, arguing, for example, that treaties could not
preempt state laws made under the police powers of the states.174
Yet Tucker expressed no doubt that the Necessary and Proper
Clause gave Congress the power to implement treaties. In his Bond
concurrence, Justice Scalia cited Tucker as supporting his
position,175 but Tucker did not advocate his reading of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. To the contrary, Tucker followed his father in
understanding the Necessary and Proper Clause to confer upon
Congress a treaty-implementing power:
[Under the Necessary and Proper Clause,] Congress may also
pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into effect “all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department of officer thereof.” The
treaty power is one of those vested in the government of the
United States, so that Congress has power to legislate on the
subject of treaties—to carry into effect the provisions that may
require legislation.176

173. E.g., HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER
(1915) [hereinafter TUCKER, LIMITATIONS]; see
also Henry St. George Tucker, The Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United
States, 199 N. AM. REV. 560, 563 (1914) (expressing dismay at the prospect that, under a broad
conception of the treaty power, “the negro from Hayti or the Congo may under a treaty be free
to enter the schools of Texas and ride in any coach on a railroad that may suit his tastes,
notwithstanding the laws of Texas to the contrary”). Tucker’s narrow-mindedness extended
to other areas of constitutional law. E.g., HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE BY
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 1-2 (1916) (arguing that “the attempt to bring about the right
of suffrage for women by an amendment to the Constitution of the United States is opposed
to the genius of the [Constitution] itself, and subversive” of federalism principles).
174. TUCKER, LIMITATIONS, supra note 173, at 320.
175. 134 S. Ct. at 2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia also cites
favorably to Westel Willougby’s constitutional law treatise, id. at 2101, but Willoughby also
believed that Congress possessed the treaty-implementing power. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 506-07 (1st ed. 1910)
(“[W]here, for its enforcement, a treaty requires ancillary legislation, Congress would seem
to have the constitutional power to enact the needed laws, even though they may relate to
matters not within the general sphere of its legislative authority.”).
176. TUCKER, LIMITATIONS, supra note 173, at 130.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 391
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Like his father, he further read the Necessary and Proper Clause
as implying that certain types of treaties must be understood as
non-self-executing.177 To be sure, Tucker resisted the idea that
treaties could enable Congress to pass laws that Congress could not
otherwise pass178—but this was because of Tucker’s narrow view of
the scope of the Treaty Clause, not because he thought the Necessary and Proper Clause did not authorize treaty implementation.
Indeed, he acknowledged that if the Treaty Clause had a broader
scope than he accepted, then the “additional concession” that
Congress could pass legislation otherwise beyond its powers to
implement treaties “might well be admitted.”179
That two authors as divergent as Butler and Tucker both
accepted that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress
to pass legislation implementing treaties signals just how uncontroversial that issue was at the time of Missouri v. Holland. They were
far from alone. Among other authors during this time to recognize
that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to pass
legislation implementing treaties were Samuel Crandall, Edward
Corwin, President William Taft, and Senator (and later Justice)
George Sutherland.180 Unlike the scope of the Treaty Clause or the
177. Id. at 17, 353 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause supported the conclusion
that treaties on subjects within Congress’s domain require congressional implementation).
178. Id. at 129. This is the passage quoted by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Bond, but
a full reading of Tucker makes clear that his objection to such legislation rested in his narrow
view of the scope of the treaty power itself rather than in doubts about Congress’s treatyimplementing power. See id. at 129-33. Justice Scalia’s description of Tucker as “famous,”
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2102, is similarly questionable.
179. TUCKER, LIMITATIONS, supra note 173, at 132.
180. EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER 291-94
(1913) (“It is further evident that when a treaty has been once entered into upon [a subject
outside Congress’s powers], Congress may pass all laws necessary and proper for the carrying
of such treaties into effect, although independently of the treaty Congress would have no
power in the premises at all.”); CRANDALL, supra note 168, at 241 (citing Neely v. Henkel for
the proposition that “Congress has the power to enact such legislation ‘as is appropriate to
give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power’ ”); GEORGE SUTHERLAND,
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 153-55 (1919) (“The necessity of supplementary
action to carry into operation treaty provisions which are not made self-executing, has the
effect of authorizing Congress to legislate upon many matters which would be beyond its
power in the absence of a treaty. In such case the authority is not derived from, nor is it
limited by, the enumerated subjects of legislation; but it arises from that clause of the
Constitution, which empowers Congress ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper.’ ”); TAFT, supra note 160, at 80-81 (reading the Necessary and Proper Clause to
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extent to which non-self-execution was constitutionally mandated,
Congress’s treaty-implementing power was generally undisputed.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This backdrop to Missouri v. Holland helps explain why Congress’s treaty-implementing power received so little attention in the
case. Unlike the scope of the treaty power, Congress’s treatyimplementing power was uncontroversial. It had a straightforward
textual basis in the Necessary and Proper Clause combined with the
Treaty Clause, as these clauses were read by virtually all who
considered the issue. It had the sanction of historical practice in the
political branches and the approval of leading commentators on the
treaty power.
Indeed, Congress’s treaty-implementing power was such an
uncontroversial issue that the parties in Missouri v. Holland briefed
it only lightly. As the brief for Mr. Holland explained:
[T]here can scarcely be a serious contention that Congress may
not enact legislation to put into effect the provisions of any
treaty which the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, may lawfully negotiate, regardless of whether the
subject matter is one within or without the general legislative
powers of Congress. If therefore, the bill in this case can be
maintained, it must be because the President, in negotiating this
treaty, has dealt with a subject which is beyond the treatymaking power of the United States.181

The accuracy of this remark is supported by the brief of Missouri,
which focused on challenging the scope of the treaty power and did
authorize legislation aimed at enforcing treaty stipulations); Chandler P. Anderson, The
Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution, 1 AM. J. INT’L L.
636, 662 (1907) (citing the Necessary and Proper Clause as the basis of congressional power
where “the treaties under consideration deal with matters beyond the ordinary jurisdiction
of Congress, and ... such a treaty is not self-executing”); see also WILLOUGHBY, supra note 175,
at 506-07.
181. See Brief for Appellee at 13, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No. 609); see
also id. at 10 (citing the Necessary and Proper Clause and observing that “there is here a
power expressly given to Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution any treaty lawfully made by the President and ratified [sic] by the
Senate”).
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not offer any clear separate challenge to Congress’s treaty-implementing power.182 Given these facts, it is unsurprising that Justice
Holmes devoted only a sentence to upholding Congress’s treatyimplementing power, observing briskly that “there can be no dispute
about the validity of [a statute implementing a valid treaty] as a
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”183
Had there been serious dispute over Congress’s treaty-implementing power, this Article has shown that Justice Holmes could have
drawn on a wealth of past practice supporting the conclusion that
the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to implement
valid treaties, whether or not the implementing legislation would
otherwise lie within Congress’s power to pass. “[T]he way the
framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has
operated according to its true nature,”184 and here historical practice
had consistently interpreted the text of the Constitution as supporting Congress’s treaty-implementing power. It was an “exposition of
the Constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts”185 such
as the trademark legislation of 1881.
By the time of Missouri v. Holland, Congress’s treaty-implementing power also furthered the interests of efficiency, reliance, and
predictability that can arise from historical practice. As non-selfexecution became accepted as a facet of some treaties, both through
the practice of the political branches and through the Supreme
Court precedent of Foster v. Neilson, the political branches could
choose this option and use congressional legislation to implement
treaty stipulations. With Congress’s treaty-implementing power
182. E.g., id. at 33 (arguing that a treaty “cannot validate [an] Act of Congress when its
effect is not only to accomplish that which under the Constitution Congress has no power to
do, but also to do that which is forbidden to the entire Federal Government in all or any of its
departments under the terms of the Constitution”). The amicus brief of Kansas did offer a
separate argument about Congress’s power to implement treaties, but this argument did not
discuss, let alone engage with, the Necessary and Proper Clause and instead rested mostly
on its concerns about the scope of the treaty power. See Brief of Richard J. Hopkins, Attorney
General, and Samuel W. Moore, Amici Curiae and in Behalf of the State of Kansas at 29-37,
Missouri, 252 U.S. 416 (No. 609).
183. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432.
184. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
185. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (adding that this “ought
not to be lightly disregarded”).
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available, they did not need to try alternative approaches, such as
writing express criminal penalties into the text of a treaty.186 As
discussed above, members of the political branches who were more
wary of treaties had indeed encouraged the developing role of
Congress in treaty implementation. They viewed this role as
providing further safeguards for limiting the use of the treaty
power.
The support that historical practice offers to Congress’s treatyimplementing power today is at least as strong—and almost
certainly even stronger—than it was in the early twentieth century.
For since that time, the constitutional acceptance of Congress’s
treaty-implementing power has not only had the sanction of the
practice of the political branches, but also the clear approval of the
Supreme Court in Neely v. Henkel and Missouri v. Holland.
Accordingly, the President and the Senate have made treaties under
the background presumption that Congress has the power to
implement treaties, including those whose text employs language
likely to be interpreted as non-self-executing and those for which
the Senate includes other indicia of non-self-execution in its advice
and consent process. Congress similarly has been authorized to pass
legislation implementing treaties without needing to determine
whether any enumerated power other than its treaty-implementing
power justifies this legislation.
There are interesting parallels here to our overall understanding
of the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This understanding was established as a matter of judicial precedent in McCullough
v. Maryland, which in turn recognized the importance of prior
legislative acts as historical practice relevant to the constitutional
question.187 In McCullough, Chief Justice Marshall warned the
“baneful influence” of a “narrow construction” of this clause and the
word “necessary” within it.188 Instead, he emphasized that “[t]his
186. Some have questioned whether treaties can directly include criminal penalties. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. i (1987) (stating that “it has
been assumed” that penal provisions in a treaty require implementing legislation). This issue
has never clearly been resolved, as treaties generally rely on executory language regarding
criminal penalties and leave it to Congress to pass implementing legislation. Both the
Migratory Bird Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention employ this approach. See
supra notes 18 and 44 and accompanying text.
187. 17 U.S. at 401.
188. Id. at 417.
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provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.”189 It therefore should be interpreted to “allow to the
national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in
the manner most beneficial to the people.”190
Whether Chief Justice Marshall correctly interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause as an originalist matter, his opinion
constitutes constitutional law that has stood the test of time in the
past and should do so in the future. As John Manning has written:
[W]hen authors purport to recover lost understandings, a
modern interpreter must consider the implications of the fact
that these understandings were putatively lost.... Madison
famously wrote, and the founders apparently widely believed,
that the Constitution would come out unfinished and that its
meaning would become settled only through the passage of time
and the accretion of practical constructions by the branches
charged with implementing it.... After almost two centuries, the
burden of persuasion on those who would displace McCulloch
strikes me as quite high.191

These words seem to me to apply equally to the task of challenging Congress’s treaty-implementing power. Professor Rosenkranz
and Justice Scalia are in effect claiming to recover a long-lost
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause—indeed, not even a lost
meaning, but rather a meaning that was never used by anyone in
the first place. The bar is a high one, and they have failed to meet
it.
Although there is a place for changing constitutional interpretations over time, it is hard to think of any sufficiently compelling
justifications for removing from the federal government a power
that not only has a strong textual basis, but that also has been
firmly entrenched without obvious opposition in the constitutional
practices of the political branches since at least the nineteenth
189. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted).
190. Id. at 421.
191. John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2012).
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century, and squarely encompassed into Supreme Court precedent
since the early twentieth century. The revived interest in federalism
principles that the Supreme Court has shown since the Rehnquist
Court certainly seems far from sufficient. Federalism was far more
important to our constitutional framework in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, and yet Congress’s treaty-implementing
power was readily accepted during this period. It is hard to see why
Congress’s treaty-implementing power should be questioned today,
other than consideration on the margin as to what specific legislation is actually “necessary and proper” to the execution, enforcement, and implementation of particular treaties.192
CONCLUSION
A note from Justice Brandeis to Justice Holmes is pasted to the
back of a copy of Missouri v. Holland. “Yes. It’s fine,” the note reads.
“May it not be well to suggest that a treaty plus an Act of Congress
may perhaps do what a treaty alone could not? It might allay
fears.”193
This suggestion speaks to a theme described throughout this
Article—the perception that having the President, the Senate, and
Congress all involved in treaty matters offers more safeguards than
relying solely on the President and the Senate. It is a theme that,
with a few exceptions, has not been cemented into constitutional
doctrine, and Justice Holmes did not incorporate it into his final
opinion. But it is a theme that has proved powerful in practice,
resulting in the increased involvement of Congress in treaty

192. Legislation like the 1881 trademark act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act suggest
that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to legislate beyond what is strictly
necessary to implement treaty obligations, in keeping with the broad approach to the
Necessary and Proper Clause taken by Chief Justice Marshall in McCullough. What is less
clear is precisely how far this reach extends. For an argument for a comparatively strict
approach to “necessary and proper” in the treaty-implementing process, see Virginia H.
Johnson, Note, Application of the Rational Basis Test to Treaty-Implementing Legislation: The
Need for a More Stringent Standard of Review, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 347 (2001). As another
possible example, Carlos Vazquez suggests that Congress’s treaty-implementing power should
not reach treaty provisions that are purely “aspirational.” Vazquez, supra note 58, at 964-65.
Although he does not explicitly link this argument to the question of what is “necessary and
proper,” I think this would be a reasonable framing for his argument.
193. 4 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 454 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1975).
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implementation and the growing practice in the courts of interpreting treaties to be non-self-executing.
There are plenty of difficult questions about the treaty power,
including its precise scope, the location and import of the boundary
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, and the
extent to which the United States can enter into international
agreements other than Senate-approved treaties. But despite the
views of Justices Scalia and Thomas, the question of whether the
Necessary and Proper Clause confers a treaty-implementing power
upon Congress is an easy one, even when Congress has no other
basis for the legislation in question. From early in our Constitutional history, members of the political branches have interpreted
the text of the Constitution to provide this power; the Supreme
Court has done the same in multiple cases; and this interpretation
is consistent with other developments in constitutional law in
relation to the treaty power. The meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in relation to the treaty power has “be[en] liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications,”194 and the consensus is clear and well-grounded.

194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229-30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

